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INTRODUCTION
Fishermen and tax collectors, because of the significant differ-
ences between their occupations, rarely come into contact with each
other in the course of their respective trades.' Recently, however, a
heated tax dispute in the seaport of New Bedford, Massachusetts
has sent lien-wielding Internal Revenue agents down to the water-
front, forcing fishermen to seek out legal counsel in the climate-con-
trolled confines of big-city law firms. 2 Fishing boat owners claim
that the IRS should classify the captains and crew members working
on their vessels as independent contractors, responsible for paying
their own taxes. The IRS disagrees, contending that many of the
captains and crew members are properly classified as employees of
the boat owners, who are in turn responsible for the payment of
employment taxes. 3
The resolution of this dispute will have far-reaching implica-
tions4 in fishing ports from New England to the Pacific Northwest, 5
and marks another chapter in a long-standing debate over whether
particular types of workers should be classified as independent con-
I Perhaps the most notable exception to this separation is described in the New
Testament, wherein four fishermen (Simon Peter, Andrew, James, and John), Matthew
4:18-22, Mark 1:16-20, Luke 5:1-11,John 1:35-42, joined a tax collector (Matthew), Mat-
thew 9:9-13, Mark 2:14-17, Luke 5:27-32, in an unprecedented collaborative effort.
2 Unfortunately for the fishermen, they do not have the same recourse as one of
their biblical predecessors. After Simon Peter was approached by the collectors of the
two-drachma tax, Jesus instructed him: "[S]o that we may not offend them, go to the
lake and throw out your line. Take the first fish you catch; open its mouth and you will
find a four-drachma coin. Take it and give it to them for my tax and yours." Matthew
17:27.
- The taxes at issue are those set forth in the Federal Insurance Contributions
Act (FICA), I.R.C. §§ 3101-3121 (1988), the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),
I.R.C. § § 3301-3311 (1988), and the Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages pro-
visions, I.R.C. §§ 3401-3406 (1988) (chapters 21, 23 and 24, respectively, of subtitle C
of the Internal Revenue Code).
4 From the New Bedford fishing fleet alone, the IRS is seeking to collect approxi-
mately $10 million in alleged back taxes. Natalie White, City Fishermen, IRS in $10 Million
Fight, THE STANDARD-TIMES (New Bedford), Oct. 7, 1989, at Al. James Costakes, gen-
eral manager of the Seafood Producers' Association, has stated that the IRS position
"could put a lot of boats in the fleet out of business." Id. Representative Gerry E.
Studds (D-Mass.) elaborated on this point: "If the IRS proceeds with its assessments
and fines, the port of New Bedford will be crippled .... We will lose boats; we will lose
jobs; and we will lose millions of dollars we ought not, under any rational interpretation
of the law, to owe." Pamela Glass, Reps Address Fishermen's Tax Problem, THE STANDARD-
TIMES (New Bedford), Oct. 13, 1989, at BI.
5 Individuals associated with the New Bedford fishing industry have appealed not
only to Massachusetts congressmen, but also to "representatives from fishing ports from
Seattle, Texas and several other areas of the country to inform them that this situation
could very well affect them in the near future." Letter from James Costakes, Seafood
Producers' Ass'n, to State Senator William Q. MacLean, Jr. (Oct. 26, 1989) (on file with
author).
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tractors or employees for employment tax purposes. 6 This Note
traces the development of this debate as it concerns the commercial
fishing industry, and seeks to clarify the standards presently applica-
ble to the classification of fishermen as independent contractors or
employees.
Part I reviews the "usual common-law rules applicable in deter-
mining the employer-employee relationship."' 7 In Part II, a survey
of employment tax cases involving both land-based and seafaring
occupations shows the uncertainty that has developed from incon-
sistent interpretations of the common-law standard.
Part III then discusses the maritime standard adopted by the
Supreme Court in United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc.8 Development of
this standard is traced through post-Webb cases involving fishermen
in employment tax disputes. For comparative purposes, application
of the maritime standard in nontax contexts, such as cases brought
under the Jones Act,9 is examined briefly.
Part IV discusses statutory developments in the employment
tax arena insofar as they have affected fishermen. This Part focuses
on the Tax Reform Act of 1976,10 which created an exemption from
employee classification for fishermen whose operations satisfy spe-
6 The "age-old question of whether an individual is an employee or independent
contractor" is likely the most litigated tax issue in the federal district courts. Gerald P.
Moran, Willfulness: The Inner Sanctum or Unnecessary Element of Section 6672, 11 U. TOL. L.
REv. 709, 823 (1980). As to the exact number of such cases, "[s]uffice it to say that a
goodly number of cases testing the agency determinations of the employer-employee
relationship question [have] reached the United States Courts." Thomas F. Broden, Jr.,
General Rules Determining the Employment Relationship Under Social Security Laws: After Twenty
Years an Unsolved Problem, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 307, 309 (1960). These disputes have involved
service station operators, Rev. Rul. 69-305, 1969-1 C.B. 259; automobile salespersons,
Rev. Rul. 72-74, 1972-1 C.B. 318; go-go girls, Mladinich v. United States, 379 F. Supp.
117 (S.D. Miss. 1974); and babysitters, Rev. Rul. 74-414, 1974-2 C.B. 334, to name but a
few.
7 I.R.C. § 3121(d)(2) (1988).
8 397 U.S. 179 (1970).
9 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employ-
ment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of per-
sonal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in the case of the death
of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal repre-
sentative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with
the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United
States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of
railway employees shall be applicable.
Id.
10 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
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cific statutory requirements. 1 These requirements are examined
closely, as are their interpretation in case law and IRS rulings.
Part V examines the current dispute between the IRS and fish-
ing boat owners in New Bedford, Massachusetts. The fishing indus-
try's practices regarding the size and compensation of crews are
described in light of the competing interpretations of the Internal
Revenue Code. 12 Prospects for resolution of this dispute-both leg-
islative and judicial-are discussed, along with the potential implica-
tions of each resolution for fishermen nationwide. Part VI analyzes
the competing positions of the IRS and the boat owners. This anal-
ysis leads to two conclusions: (1) the express policy of Congress
favors preserving the exemption of the fishing boat owners from
employment tax liability; and (2) any efforts to increase tax compli-
ance within the fishing industry should be prospective, rather than
retroactive, in effect.
I
THE COMMON-LAW STANDARD
Federal law' 3 imposes significant excise and withholding tax
obligations on employers with respect to wages paid to their
"employees." 14 Consequently, a putative employer's tax liability
depends greatly upon the classification of its workers as either "em-
ployees" or "independent contractors." 15 If the employer does not
11 I.R.C. §§ 3121(b)(20), 3306(c)(18), and 3401(a)(17) (1988). See infra note 137
for the text of I.R.C. § 3121 (b)(20), which is incorporated by reference into I.R.C.
§§ 3401(a)(17) and 3306(c)(18).
12 The principal disagreement concerns I.R.C. § 3121(b)(20) and, consequently,
I.R.C. §§ 3306(c)(18) and 3401(a)(17).
13 See supra note 3.
14 Under FICA, both the employer and its employees contribute a stated
percentage of taxable wages paid for employment or social security taxes.
The tax rate for both 1988 and 1989 is 7.51 percent, with a scheduled
increase to 7.65 percent for 1990. This tax is assessed on the employer
and the employee for an effective FICA tax of 15.02 percent on the first
$48,000 of wages paid to an employee in 1989.
Under FUTA, the unemployment tax is the sole responsibility of the
employer. The liability is 6.2 percent of taxable wages on the first $7,000
of wages. Because the FUTA system works in tandem with state unem-
ployment systems, an employer can receive a credit of up to 5.4 percent
for its state unemployment tax liability, for an effective rate of .8 percent.
Under the withholding chapter of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 .... an employer is also required to withhold income tax on wages
paid to its employees. The employer is required to report and pay over
each of the three taxes: its portion of the FICA tax, the FUTA tax and the
withheld income tax.
Andra P. Ozols & Mark H. Scheffel, The Independent Contractor Versus The Employee-Tax
Corsequences, 18 COLO. LAw. 1091, 1091 (1989).
15 "Deciding whether to classify a worker as an employee or as an independent
contractor can present an interesting and analytical challenge for courts and counsel
alike, but verges on Russian roulette for the business owner." Helen E. Marmoll, Em-
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file the proper employment tax returns in a timely manner, it is sub-
ject not only to liability for the taxes themselves, but also to severe
penalties.1 6
Notwithstanding the importance of correctly classifying a
worker for employment tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code
and accompanying regulations provide relatively little guidance as
to the definition of an "employee."' 17 The Federal Insurance Con-
tributions Act (FICA)' 8 defines the term "employee" to mean "any
individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in de-
termining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an
employee."1 9 The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)20 incor-
porates this language by providing that "the term 'employee' has
the meaning assigned to such term by section 3121(d)." 2' The
Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages provisions 22 do not
provide a definition of the term "employee," but instead supply a
ployer-Employee Relations: Independent Contractor vs. Employee Status, 37 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX'N ch. 29, § 29.01, at 29-2 (1979).
16 Douglas Banks &John Brescher, Employee or Independent Contractor? Recent Rulings,
Cases Focus on Control Element, 15 TAX'N FOR AccT. 286, 286 (1975). See also David M.
Flynn, Employment Taxes: Resurging Enforcement Activity, 62 A.B.A. J. 915, 917 (1976) ("In
many cases these procedures result not only in the assessment of deficiencies that far
exceed the taxpayer's actual liability but also in the possibility of a windfall to the gov-
ernment in the form of a double collection of taxes.").
17 Aaron Levine, Current Factors That Distinguish Between "Employee" and "'Independent
Contractor," 37J. TAX'N 188, 188 (1972).
18 I.R.C. §§ 3101-3121 (1988).
19 Id. § 3121(d)(2). The Status Quo Resolution of 1948, ch. 468, § 1, 62 Star. 438,
438 (1948) first added this language to the Code, although the Treasury had issued
regulations referring to the traditional common-law rules some 12 years earlier. Treas.
Reg. 90, art. 205 (1936). Before these regulations were promulgated, the common-law
test was assumed to be the basis for status determinations. Jock A. Banks & Deborah Y.
Clark, The Employment Tax Moratorium: Perpetuation of the Status Quo or a New Beginning?, 24
How. LJ. 271, 277 (1981).
The present FICA definition of employee also includes
(1) any officer of a corporation; or... (3) any individual.., who per-
forms services for remuneration for any person- (A) as an agent-driver
or commission-driver engaged in distributing [various comestibles], or
laundry or dry-cleaning services, for his principal; (B) as a full-time life
insurance salesman; (C) as a home worker performing work, according to
specifications furnished by the person for whom the services are per-
formed, on materials or goods furnished by such person which are re-
quired to be returned to such person or a person designated by him; or
(D) as a [full-time] traveling or city salesman ... or (4) any individual who
performs services that are included under an agreement entered into pur-
suant to section 218 of the Social Security Act.
I.R.C. § 3121(d)(1), (3), (4) (1988).
20 I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988).
21 Id. § 3306(i). The FUTA definition of employee, however, is not identical to its
FICA counterpart since FUTA excludes individuals described in § 3121(d)(4),
§ 3121(d)(3)(B), and § 3121(d)(3)(C) of the FICA. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988). For
present purposes, however, the relevant portions of these definitions are the same.
22 I.R.C. §§ 3401-3406 (1988).-
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brief list of individuals who are properly classified as such.23 Regu-
lations promulgated under these provisions have made clear, how-
ever, that the term also includes individuals who are employees
under the common-law rules.24
Employers, or those who handle their taxes, often must classify
their workers according to the "usual common-law rules" referred
to above 25 because most individuals do not fall within the specific
categories of statutory employees. 26 In many instances, the "nine-
to-five" nature of a worker's position leaves little doubt that she is
an employee for whom her employer must withhold or pay employ-
ment taxes. 27 However, when the nature of an individual's work is
less conventional, the application of the "usual common-law rules"
may yield no clear answer.28
The regulations add to the confusion and uncertainty inherent
in this area: "Whether the relationship of employer and employee
exists under the usual common law rules will in doubtful cases
be determined upon an examination of the particular facts of
each case." 29 Of course, only the doubtful cases will reach the
courts.3 0 Thus, by their very nature, cases involving the employee-
independent contractor issue will be fact-specific. For a taxpayer
who must classify her workers, prior agency and court decisions pro-
23 The statute provides:
For purposes of this chapter, the term 'employee' includes an officer, em-
ployee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political
subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instru-
mentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term 'employee' also
includes an officer of a corporation.
Id § 3401(c).
24 Treas. Reg. 102, § 19A65-5 (1943); Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.465-5 (1943); Treas.
Reg. 115, § 404.104 (1943); and Treas. Reg. 116, § 405.104 (1951).
25 As one accountant has noted, "The most difficult tests are those in which the
statutory definition of 'employee' refers us to 'the usual Common-Law Rules applicable
in determining the employer-employee relationship.'" Barry H. Frank, Are They Employ-
ees or Independent Contractors? A Practical Example for Distinguishing the Two, 8 TAX'N FOR
Acc-r. 350, 351 (1972) (quoting I.R.C. § 3121(d)(2) (1988)).
26 For a partial list of the statutory categories, see supra notes 19, 23.
27 In the words of one commentator, "No one questions the fact that the 20 million
'Joe and Jane Bluecollars' who work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. for $2.31 per hour and
are told to tighten nuts 3 and 4 as they pass them on the assembly line are employees."
Broden, supra note 16, at 311.
28 "These situations undoubtedly involve small numbers of individuals in relation
to the total national work force, but in absolute terms their number is substantial."
Flynn, supra note 16, at 916.
29 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 1980); Treas. Reg. § 31.3306
(i)-l(c) (1960); Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(d) (as amended in 1970).
30 "[T]he main business of the adjudicatory phases of the judicial and administra-
tive processes ... is to render decisions in ... borderline cases. No one takes the easy
cases to court." Broden, supra note 6, at 311.
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vide reliable guidance only to the extent that they involve fact pat-
terns almost identical to her own.
Nevertheless, agency and court decisions have provided some
meaningful content to the "usual common-law rules" that deter-
mine the employer-employee relationship. Unfortunately, they have
not always done so with complete unanimity or consistency. The
following subparts provide a general overview of the various inter-
pretations of the "usual common-law rules" which the courts and
the IRS have adopted.
A. The Control Test
Regulations promulgated under the employment tax provisions
provide that the legal relationship of employer and employee gener-
ally exists:
when the person for whom services are performed has the right to
control and direct the individual who performs the services, not
only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to
the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That
is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer
not only as to what shall be done but how it shall be done.31
This control factor is the starting point for any inquiry as to the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.3 2 However, as an-
other excerpt from the regulations shows, control is not the only
relevant factor considered:
The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating that
the person possessing that right is an employer. Other factors
characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present in every
case, are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to
work, to the individual who performs the services.33
31 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (emphasis added). The corresponding regula-
tions under FUTA and the income tax withholding provisions contain identical lan-
guage. Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(i)-1(b); Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b). Significantly,
these same regulations also provide that it is not necessary that the employer actually
control or direct the manner in which the services are performed; an employer-
employee relationship is established simply by the fact that the employer has the right to
do so.
32 See Banks & Brescher, supra note 16, at 291 ("The importance of other factors
seems to ebb and flow as the factual situation changes, but all of the cases say the right
to direct the actions of the worker as he or she performs is important to an employer-
employee relationship."); Laura A. Quigley, Cost Increases for Misclassifying a Worker as an
Independent Contractor, 39 TAX'N FOR AccT. 116, 116 (1987) ("[Mlost courts have consid-
ered the right-to-control test to be the single most important factor.").
33 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(i)-1(b); Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3401(c)-I(b).
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This position coincides with the long-standing position of the IRS.
Rulings issued shortly after enactment of the Social Security Act 34 in
1935 stated that a number of factors, including control, determined
the employer-employee question, but that no single factor con-
trolled conclusively. 35
Most of the early employment tax cases purported to follow the
common-law control test.3 6 Despite the regulations and revenue
rulings, however, courts differed as to whether the control factor
alone was conclusive. In Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 37
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, took the view
that: "The test lies in the degree to which the principal may inter-
vene to control the details of the agent's performance; and that in
the end is all. that can be said . "..."38
Other courts, more in line with the stated IRS position, ex-
pressly took into account other factors, even though control re-
mained the most important factor. In Jones v. Goodson,39 the Tenth
Circuit relied heavily on the control factor in holding that certain
taxi drivers were employees. Yet Judge Bratton also considered as
relevant factors the manner of compensation, the impermanence of
the relationship, and the putative employer's right to discharge the
drivers.40
34 Act of August 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1990)).
35 For example, in a 1937 ruling, the IRS stated:
In determining whether an individual is an employee or independent
contractor, the following, among other things, should be considered:
(1) The extent of control which the employer may exercise over the de-
tails of the work either under the contract or in fact; (2) the skill required
in the particular occupation; (3) whether the employer or workman sup-
plies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work; (4) whether the
one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (5) the
length of time for which the person is employed; and (6) the method of
payment, whether by the time or by the job.
S.S.T. 212, 1937-2 C.B. 397. The use of the phrase, "among other things," indicates
that this six-factor list was not meant to be exhaustive. See also S.S.T. 183, 1937-2 C.B.
388 ("Other factors characteristic of an employer [aside from control] are the furnishing
of tools and a place to work to the individual who performs the services.").
36 Those that did not often applied an "economic reality" test. See infra notes 41-
48 and accompanying text.
37 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding that vaudeville actors were properly classi-
fied as independent contractors).
38 Id. at 717 (emphasis added). It is worth noting, however, that in an earlier case
regarding the status of distributors of large petroleum companiesJudge Hand's opinion
seemed to take into account other factors as well. Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F.2d 636
(2d Cir. 1941). This discrepancy highlights the danger in "drawing broad general pro-
positions from particular cases. Because ajudge in one case alludes only to the factor of
control does not mean that in every case he would consider control to be the exclusive
and conclusive factor." Broden, supra note 6, at 313.
39 121 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1941).
40 Id. at 179.
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The courts in these two cases claimed to apply the same test, yet
their respective approaches were appreciably different. Such a dis-
crepancy demonstrates how uncertainty continued to surround the
employee-independent contractor question. Had the confusion
been limited to defining the contours of the common-law test, it may
well have dissipated-at least within any given circuit. But in 1944
the Supreme Court added a new consideration to the mix which en-
sured the continued existence of the employment tax morass.
B. The "Economic Reality" Test
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,41 the Supreme Court ex-
pressed its view that common-law principles were not helpful in de-
termining the employer-employee relationship in cases involving
social legislation.42 The Court established a rule of statutory con-
struction for the interpretation of legislation requiring national uni-
formity.43 It required that courts interpret such legislation in light
of its history and purposes. 44 Since Congress enacted the National
Labor Relations Act to implement a public policy unknown at com-
mon law, the Court concluded that the term "employee" should be
construed broadly, by examining the "economic reality" of the situ-
ation in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be
achieved. 45
Soon after the Hearst decision, a number of courts applied the
"economic reality" test to other cases arising under the Social Se-
curity Act. In United States v. Vogue, Inc. ,46 Judge Parker wrote:
Common law rules as to distinctions between servants and in-
dependent contractors throw but little light on the question in-
volved. The Social Security Act ... was enacted pursuant to a
public policy unknown to the common law; and its applicability is
to be judged rather from the purposes that Congress had in mind
than from common law rules worked out for determining tort
liability.47
41 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (holding that newsboys were employees for purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act).
42 In the Hearst case, the legislation in question was the National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
43 322 U.S. at 122-23.
44 Id. at 124.
45 Id. (quoting South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259
(1939)).
46 145 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1944) (holding a seamstress working at the taxpayer's
store to be an employee).
47 Id. at 612 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
1992]
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Other courts did not depart entirely from the common-law rules,
but rather supplemented them with a concurrent consideration of
the purposes of the relevant legislation.48
By the Social Security Act's tenth birthday, the early cases
demonstrated the courts' widespread disagreement about which test
applied to determining the employer-employee relationship.
Courts that applied the common-law rules often disagreed about the
exact content of those rules-particularly with respect to the impor-
tance of the control factor. 49 Other courts repudiated the common-
law rules altogether and looked to the purposes of the Act to guide
them.50 To muddy the waters further, still other courts fashioned
an approach combining the common-law rules and the legislative
purposes. 51 Given this state of affairs, it was only a matter of time
before the Supreme Court entered the fray once again.
C. The 1947 Cases
Faced with mounting disagreement among courts, in 1947 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in three employment tax cases:
United States v. Silk,52 Harrison v. Greyvan Lines, Inc.,53 and Bartels v.
Birmingham.54 In the first two cases, the Court endorsed the "eco-
nomic reality" test, and stated that application of the Social Security
Act should follow "the same rule that we applied to the National
Labor Relations Act in the Hearst case." 55 According to the major-
ity, this test involved an examination of the "total situation," 56 in-
cluding "degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss,
investment in facilities, permanency of relation and skill required in
the ... operation . . . . 57 Ruling out the existence of a "rule of
thumb to define the limits of the employer-employee relationship,"
the Court stated that no one factor was controlling, and that the list
was by no means complete. 58
48 See, e.g., Nevins, Inc. v. Rothensies, 151 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.), aff'g 58 F. Supp. 460
(E.D. Pa. 1945); Grace v. Magruder, 148 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 326 U.S. 720
(1945); United States v. Aberdeen Aeire No. 24, 148 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1945).
49 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
50 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
51 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52 331 U.S. 704 (1947) (Reed, J.) (four justices dissenting in part) (holding coal
truckers to be independent contractors, and coal unloaders to be employees).
53 Id. (holding furniture truckers to be independent contractors).
54 332 U.S. 126 (1947) (Reed, J.) (three justices dissenting) (holding musicians to
be employees of their bandleader, and the dance hall owner to be the employer of
neither the musicians nor the bandleader).
55 331 U.S. at 713-14.
56 Id. at 719.
57 Id. at 716.
58 Id.
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In Bartels, decided a week later, the Court reaffirmed its position
in Silk and Greyvan:
[T]he relationship of employer-employee ... [is] not to be deter-
mined solely by the idea of control .... [11n the application of
social legislation employees are those who as a matter of eco-
nomic reality are dependent upon the business to which they
render service .... [P]ermanency of the relation, the skill re-
quired, the investment in the facilities for work, and opportunities
for profit or loss from the activities [are] also factors that should
enter into judicial determination .... It is the total situation that
controls.59
Of the various theories of interpretation available to the
Court,60 Justice Reed seems to have adopted a hybrid approach.
The Court looked at both the common-law rules-involving an anal-
ysis of several factors, one of which was control-and the purposes
of the legislation involved. In so doing, it avoided a potentially con-
troversial repudiation of the common-law rules,6 ' and yet did not
limit itself to a myopic analysis focused on the factor of control.62
The Court's opinions in Silk, Greyvan, and Bartels delineated the
broad, general principles applicable in determining the employer-
employee relationship. An excerpt from Judge Graven's opinion in
Tapager v. Birmingham6 3 illustrates the view of the lower federal
courts in the wake of the 1947 cases:
The factors referred to by the Supreme Court in [Silk, Greyvan,
and Bartels] are not new to the law. All of them have been noted at
some time or other in cases in the general field of law having to do
with the legal responsibility of one person for the actions of
another.64
The breadth and generality of the principles stated by the Supreme
Court failed to provide the concrete guidance that lower courts and
taxpayers so badly needed.65
59 332 U.S. at 130.
60 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
61 For such a departure from the common-law rules, see Judge Parker's opinion in
United States v. Vogue, 145 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1944).
62 For an analysis focused predominantly on the factor of control, see Judge Hand's
opinion in Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
63 75 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
64 Id. at 388.
65 "U]ust as courts differed before the Supreme Court decisions of 1947 as to the
test for the employer-employee relationship so some of these same differences persisted
after the 1947 cases." Broden, supra note 6, at 324.
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D. Proposed Regulations and Congressional Reaction
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its decisions
in Silk, Greyvan, and Bartels, the Treasury Department issued pro-
posed regulations purportedly in conformance with the principles
enunciated in those cases. 66 However, the proposed regulations fo-
cused primarily upon the words "economic reality," in which the
Treasury saw an inviting opportunity to expand the definition of
"employee." 67
Congress reacted to these proposed regulations dramatically,
viewing them as an "unwarranted broadening of the definition of
employee."6 8 On June 14, 1948, Congress enacted the Status Quo
Resolution, which rejected the "economic reality" test and explicitly
reaffirmed that the "usual common-law rules" controlled the
employee-independent contractor inquiry.69 The legislative histo-
ries of FICA and FUTA indicate that Congress hoped explicit adop-
tion of the common-law test would eliminate much of the confusion
surrounding the classification of workers for employment tax pur-
poses. 70 This hope was not fully realized, however, leaving the
courts and taxpayers (including, of course, fishermen) to wade
through the employment tax morass in search of uniform rules to
guide their respective decisions. 71
II
ONE RULE BY LAND, THE SAME ONE BY SEA
Throughout all the developments described thus far, the IRS
classified fishermen according to the same standard as workers in
any land-based occupation. The statutory language was clear and
explicit, and courts refused to read into it an incorporation of mari-
time law.7 2
66 12 Fed. Reg. 7966-69 (1947) (proposed Nov. 26, 1947).
67 John E. North, The Employment Tax Morass, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 775, 783
(1978).
68 Id.
69 The Status Quo Resolution of 1948, ch. 468, § 1, 62 Stat. 438, 438 (1948). For a
comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of the Status Quo Resolution of
1948, see Broden, supra note 6, at 383-89.
70 "[T]he usual common-law rules, realistically applied, must be used to determine
whether a person is an 'employee' .... And properly interpreted they should resolve
the conflict of lower court decisions and encourage nation-wide uniformity of applica-
tion .... " S. RtP. No. 1255, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
71 One commentator, writing a decade after the Status Quo Resolution was
adopted, explained the situation this way: "After twenty-two years the basic test for
determining the employer-employee relationship . . . remains uncertain and unclear."
Broden, supra note 6, at 389-90.
72 E.g., United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 402 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 397
U.S. 179 (1970); see also United States v. Crawford Packing Co., 330 F.2d 194 (5th Cir.
1964) (rejecting sub silentio the government's maritime-oriented definition of "em-
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A. The Early Cases
In Emard v. Squire,7 3 the court referred to "the well-recognized
principles that distinguish an 'employee' from an 'independent con-
tractor' "74 in finding that fishermen who sold fish to a salmon pack-
ing company were not employees of that company under FICA:
"[T]he fishermen were independent contractors, not subject to the
orders or direction of the plaintiffs either as to when, where or how
they should catch fish, nor as to the conditions under which they
would carry on their operations.. .. -75
A Massachusetts district court presumably applied the same
common-law rules in O'Hara Vessels v. Hassett 7 6 to reach a different
result.7 7 In that case, the district court held the captains and crew
members of a fishing schooner to be employees of the vessel's own-
ers for employment tax purposes. 78 At first glance, the facts of the
case closely resemble those of Emard. For the most part, the captain
assembled his crew as he saw fit.79 He had the power to hire and fire
crew members, and while at sea he had the usual captain's power to
direct them.8 0 In addition, the captain determined where the vessel
would fish and when it would return from its voyage."1 These facts,
taken alone, suggest that the captain, and not the vessel owner, em-
ployed the crew, and that the captain himself was an independent
contractor. In the eyes of the court, however, the vessel owner re-
tained sufficient control over the operation to be classified as the
employer of both the captain and the crew members.8 2 In addition
to retaining some control over the hiring of the crew, the vessel
ployee" for tax purposes); Barrett v. Phinney, 278 F. Supp. 65, 71 (S.D. Tex. 1968)
("The applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code make no distinction between an
employee for purposes of a tax case involving maritime personnel and any other type of
employee, and it must be assumed that no distinction was intended.").
73 58 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Wash. 1945).
74 Id. at 288. Earlier in the opinion the court noted, "There have been numerous
decisions on this question, and all of them ... hold that the common-law tests shall be
applied in ascertaining, from an established set of facts, whether the relationship be that
of an 'employee' or an 'independent contractor.'" Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
75 Id. at 286.
76 60 F. Supp. 672 (D. Mass. 1942).
77 Although the district court did not explicitly address the standard it was applying
to the facts before it, its holding was qualified by the phrase, "within the meaning of the
applicable provisions of [FICA]." Id. at 674. These provisions, of course, would call for
the application of the common-law test. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
78 60 F. Supp. at 674.
79 The owner retained the right to hire the engineer that served on the boat and
had recently instructed the captain not to employ aliens. Id.
80 Id. at 673.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 674.
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owner retained the power to hire and fire the captain and to substi-
tute an existing captain with a new one of his choice.8 3
As the Emard and O'Hara Vessels cases demonstrated, the uncer-
tainty that surrounded the employee-independent contractor ques-
tion was "amphibious. ' ' 4 The task of giving meaning to the "usual
common law rules applicable in determining the employer-
employee relationship"8 5 became no easier when the question arose
on the bounding main.8 6
B. In the Wake of the 1947 Cases
In Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co. ,87 a case involving
the status of fishermen for purposes of employment taxes, the
Supreme Court authoritatively settled on the United States v. Silk
common-law test"8 as the standard for ascertaining the existence of
an employer-employee relationship.8 9 Consistent with the inability
of the Silk case and its progeny to foster predictable outcomes, 90 the
Court in Williams Packing & Navigation did no more than affirm the
confusion inherent in the status quo. Indeed, the following survey
of post-1947 employment tax cases shows that, like their counter-
parts in land-based occupations, fishermen lacked both sextant and
compass as they sought to navigate the employment tax seas.
During the 1960s, more than a few courts entertained the tax
reffind claims of fishermen who had been caught in the IRS's net.9'
In United States v. Crawford Packing Co. ,92 the Fifth Circuit noted what
had become a truism in the employment tax arena: "There is no
difficulty in finding that the question of who is an employee is to be
83 Id.
84 Amphibious is defined as "1. living or operating both on land and in water.
2. involving both sea and land forces ...." OXFORD AMERICAN DICIONARY 21 (1980).
85 Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 1.R.C. § 3121(d)(2) (1988).
86 A comparison of the Emard and O'Hara Vessels opinions also demonstrates how
the outcomes of such cases are closely tied to their particular facts. See supra notes 29-30
and accompanying text.
87 370 U.S. 1 (1962) (upholding the Government's claim that a corporation, which
furnished boats to captains of its own choice who then hired their own crews and sold
their catch to the corporation, was the employer of the fishermen and liable for employ-
ment taxes, and holding that the collection of such taxes could not be erjoined even
though the collection would destroy the corporation's business), overruled by South Caro-
lina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
88 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
89 370 U.S. at 3.
90 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
91 Because the Tax Court has no jurisdiction over employment tax cases, I.R.C.
§ 7422 (1988), there is usually no opportunity to litigate the merits of an employment
tax dispute prior to assessment and collection of at least some of the taxes involved.
Thus, most of the cases involving the employee-independent contractor question come
before the courts as taxpayer actions for the refund of taxes already paid.
92 330 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1964).
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determined under usual common-law rules, but there is great diffi-
culty in applying those rules." 95 In affirming the lower court's find-
ing that the captains and deck hands on the taxpayer's shrimp
fishing boats were not employees of the taxpayer, Judge Rives re-
ferred to cases with similar facts which supported either outcome.9 4
In Cape Shore Fish Co. v. United States,95 one of the cases support-
ing the opposite outcome, the court of claims held that captains and
crew members were employees of the owner of the Lauren Fay, a
scalloper out of New Bedford, Massachusetts. 96 While it expressly
applied a control-oriented test reminiscent of the traditional
common-law approach, 97 the court of claims also considered factors
unique to the fishing industry, 98 suggesting a move towards a quasi-
maritime standard.99
The 1967 case of W.M. Webb, Inc. v. United States 100 temporarily
thwarted such a move. In holding that the captains and crew mem-
bers in question were not employees of the plaintiff boat owners,
93 Id. at 196; see also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944)
("Few problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in re-
sults than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-
employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial deal-
ing."); Jackson v. Phinney, 266 F. Supp. 835, 836 (W.D. Tex. 1967) ("[I]t is well settled
today that these [common-law tests] are the standards to be applied. The problem con-
sists in the application of these standards.").
94 For cases holding that the captains and crew members of fishing vessels were not
employees of the vessel owners within FICA and FUTA, see Barrett v. Phinney, 278 F.
Supp. 65 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Star Fish & Oyster Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 402
(S.D. Ala. 1963); see also Maniscalco v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 97 N.E.2d
639, 640 (Mass. 1951) (a Massachusetts case applying "the principles of the common
law" under that state's employment security law). For cases reaching the opposite con-
clusion, see Kirkconnell v. United States, 347 F.2d 260 (Ct. Cl. 1965);Jackson, 266 F.
Supp. 835 (W.D. Tex. 1967); Capital Trawlers, Inc. v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 440
(D. Me. 1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1963); see also Rev. Rul. 57-168, 1957-1 C.B.
337 ("[Ihe 'company fishermen' are employees ... for Federal employment tax pur-
poses .... [T]he 'independent fishermen' are not employees ... for such purposes.").
To affirm the district court's holding, the court of appeals in Crawford Pacing simply
had to find that the holding was not clearly erroneous. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Given the
availability of precedents to support either holding under the recorded facts, the court
would have been hard pressed to justify reversal.
95 330 F.2d 961 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
96 Id. at 970. The present dispute between the IRS and boat owners in the port of
New Bedford is clearly not the first of its kind.
97 Id. at 964.
98 For example, the court stated: "As was customary in the fishing industry, the
captain and not the owner hired the crew." Id. at 966. Recognition of this maritime
custom was significant, since a mechanical application of the land-based common-law
test might have yielded a conclusion that the owner, by allowing the captain to hire the
crew, had relinquished more control than he in fact had.
99 Recall how courts had refused to recognize an incorporation of maritime law into
the common-law standard. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
100 271 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 397
U.S. 179 (1970).
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Judge Cassibry wasted few words in summarizing the influence of
maritime law upon his decision: "The [Government's] contention
that the common-law [sic] governing the relationship of the tax-
payer and the fishermen in pursuing fishing ventures in the Gulf of
Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean is the general maritime law is with-
out merit."''
Following this decision, the Treasury sought to amend the
FICA provisions to include as employees the captains and crews of
commercial fishing vessels.' 0 2 But as it had before, 103 Congress re-
jected an attempt to broaden the definition of employee. 1°4 The
Treasury could only watch as the court of appeals affirmed Webb in
an almost apologetic fashion:
If we were free to apply maritime law as a test of the employer-
employee relationship, we would reverse the decision of the dis-
trict court. This is so because it is clear that under maritime law
the captain is the agent of the owner (on the facts here) and the
crew hands are employees .... It seems questionable, at best,
whether Congress, in re-affirming the use of the common law test,
intended thereby to incorporate maritime law under the FICA and
FUTA. 105
The Treasury's position had only run aground; it had not yet
sunk. Because of the apparent conflict between the court of claims
decision in Cape Shore Fish Co. and the court of appeals decision in
Webb, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the latter.'0 6
Its subsequent decision in that case buoyed the government's cause
and set a new course for courts (and taxpayers) that were attempting
to determine the employment status of commercial fishermen.
III
THE MARITIME LAW STANDARD
A. A New Standard Sets Sail
In 1970, a unanimous Supreme Court handed down its opinion
in United States v. WM. Webb. 10 7 The Court concluded that the court
of appeals had erred in declining to judge the status of the captains
and crewmen against the standards of maritime law.108 In vindicat-
101 Webb, 271 F. Supp. at 257.
102 North, supra note 67, at 790.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
104 S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 203-05, 320-24 (1967); H.R. REP. No.
1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1967).
105 United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 402 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 397
U.S. 179 (1970).
106 394 U.S. 996 (1969).
107 397 U.S. 179 (1970).
108 Id. at 194.
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ing the Treasury's position, Justice Harlan wrote for his colleagues:
"We do not think Congress intended the anomalous result of having
maritime activities subject to standards... other than those that are
relevant to seafaring enterprises."10 9
The taxpayers argued that by failing to make specific provision
for the application of maritime law in the Status Quo Resolution,
Congress had impliedly decreed that seafaring occupations should
be governed by the common-law standards applicable to land-based
activities.' 1 0 The Court disagreed, maintaining that the chief objec-
tive of the 1948 Resolution, "avoiding the uncertainty of the pro-
posed 'economic reality' test,""' was achieved by testing seafaring
work relationships against the standards of maritime law:
Maritime law, the common law of seafaring men, provides an es-
tablished network of rules and distinctions that are practically
suited to the necessities of the sea .... The goal of minimizing
uncertainty can be accomplished, in the maritime field, by resort
to the 'usual' rules of maritime jurisprudence. 12
As it is under the land-based test, control is the most important
factor under the maritime standard. 13 The Court recognized, how-
ever, that in most maritime relationships the workers enjoy discre-
tion that is "unusually broad if measured by land-based standards-
a discretion dictated by the seafaring nature of the activity." 114
With this reality in mind, the Court established a stringent standard
for fishing boat owners who tried to refute their status as employers
of their captains and crews: "[E]xcept where there is nearly total
relinquishment of control through a bareboat, or demise, charter,
the owner may nevertheless be considered, under maritime law, to
have sufficient control to be charged with the duties of an em-
ployer."1-5 Most commercial fishing boat owners would find this a
most difficult standard to meet.
109 Id. at 190. Interestingly, the Court found the Treasury's failure to convince Con-
gress to explicitly include captains and crew members as employees after the district
court decision irrelevant to congressional intent. Webb, 397 U.S. at 194 n.21.
110 Id. at 189.
M1 Id. at 191.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 192. Because of its narrow application, the Court's opinion did little to
remove the confusion that still abounded in other employment contexts: "Congress'
stress on the importance of control ... does not preclude the application, in different
areas, of decisional rules that vary in the precise degree of control that is required." Id.
at 192-93 (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 192; see also Bishop v. United States, 476 F.2d 977, 980 (5th Cir. 1973)
("The... independence of ... [ship]masters from detailed orders on how to perform
their work.., inheres in the calling of those who go down to the sea in ships. On the
most obscure of vessels the master is the Lord of the Quarter Deck.").
115 397 U.S. at 192. The bareboat or demise charter has been explained thus:
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B. The Standard Proves Seaworthy
After its maiden voyage in Webb,' 1 6 the maritime standard soon
underwent additional testing in the court of appeals. The first of
these tests was in the Fifth Circuit, in the 1971 case of Anderson v.
United States." 7 In Anderson, the court held the captains and crews
who manned the taxpayers' boats to be the taxpayers' employees." 18
Referring to the Webb standard, Judge Gewin concluded: "The ar-
rangements between the shipowners and the captains did not consti-
tute a bareboat or demise charter."' 19
In advocating affirmance of the favorable district court holding,
the taxpayers argued for the application of "a sort of brackish form
of land-based common law principles,"' 20 which integrated factors
comprising the "usual common law rules" with general maritime
law.' 2 ' Judge Gewin flatly rejected this contention and reaffirmed
the exclusively maritime nature of the standard that had been set
forth in Webb: "This case cannot be decided according to land-
based common law or upon theories that are a mixture of common
law and maritime law. We must move entirely away from the shore
to the wide, open sea."' 22
Following this "extended articulation of controlling princi-
ples,"' 123 the Fifth Circuit disposed of a series of cases that had been
In [such an arrangement], the charterer takes over the ship, lock, stock
and barrel, and mans her with his own people. He becomes, in effect, the
owner pro hac vice, just as does the lessee of a house and lot, to whom the
demise charterer is analogous.
.... The demise, in practical effect and in important legal conse-
quence, shifts the possession and control of the vessel from one person
to another, just as the shoreside lease of real property shifts many of the
incidents of ownership from lessor to lessee. The owner of a demised
ship still has interests in her, just as the lessor has interests in the house
and lot he has leased to somebody else. But the principal interests the
shipowner has are in receiving the agreed hire and getting the vessel back
at the end of the term ....
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 194, 239 (2d ed.
1975). And elsewhere: "In a [demise charter], not only the entire capacity of the ship is
let, but the ship itself, and the possession is passed to the charterer. The entire control
and management of it is given up to him." 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 14 (1974).
116 On remand, the court of appeals made good on its "promise," see supra note 105
and accompanying text, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
dismiss the taxpayers' complaints. 424 F.2d 1070, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970) [hereinafter
Webb II].
117 450 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1971).
118 Id. at 572.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 570.
121 Id. at 570 n.5.
122 Id. at 570.
123 Bishop v. United States, 476 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'g 334 F. Supp.
415 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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decided after Webb, but before Anderson. 124 In Bishop v. United
States,125 ChiefJudge Brown expressed the hope that "[t]he ten year
Odyssey of who is the employer-shipmaster or owner-of crew
members of fishing vessels . . . for the payment of [employment]
taxes ... may ... be closer to an end."' 26 After reaffirming the
validity of the trial court's findings of fact,127 he nevertheless re-
versed its holding: "We simply determine that the facts found by
the District Court are not significantly different from those in Ander-
son and-as there and in Webb II-we hold that they are insufficient
to make out the requisite surrender of control of the vessel by her
owner to the master." 128
With the salvage of any portion of the more generous common-
law test out of the question, 129 the taxpayers' tack in Bishop was to
argue for a lenient form of the maritime standard.'30 In rejecting
any bifurcation of the maritime law, Chief Judge Brown eloquently
characterized the boat owners' request:
What they seek now is not a maritime law for the Medes and Per-
sians which altereth not. Rather they seek a maritime law of
demise charter for [injury-death] purposes on a stricter "humani-
tarian" basis and another parallel, but much looser, standard for
"commercial" purposes which would obviously include tax
cases.
131
124 Along with the principal case, id, the court of appeals disposed of three similar
cases: Carleen F, Inc. v. United States, 476 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1973); Elizabeth Ann, Inc.
v. United States, 476 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1973); and Mayport Fisheries Co. v. United
States, 476 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1973).
125 476 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1973).
126 Id. at 977-78. This hope may have been bolstered by Rev. Rul. 72-385, 1972-2
C.B. 535, which had been issued as the Bishop case was making its way up to the court of
appeals. By its own terms, the purpose of the Revenue Ruling was "to update and re-
state, under current statute and regulations," the IRS position on the question of
"whether fishermen performing services on fishing schooners owned by a company are
employees of the company or the captains." Id. at 536.
127 Bishop, 476 F.2d at 978.
128 Id. (footnote omitted).
129 See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
130 Bishop, 476 F.2d at 978.
131 Id. For applications of the maritime standard to determine employee status
outside the employment tax context, see, e.g., Wheatley v. Gladden, 660 F.2d 1024,
1026 (4th Cir. 1981) ("[Ain employer/employee relationship is a necessary antecedent
to.a Jones Act negligence claim ... and to a 'maintenance and cure' claim .. "); The
Norland, 101 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1939) ("[A]n injured seaman is granted a cause of
action by the [Merchant Marine Act] only against one as to whom he occupies the con-
ventional relationship of 'employee.' "); Cromwell v. Slaney, 65 F.2d 940, 941 (1st Cir.
1933) ("[I]n order for the representative of a deceased seaman to recover under the
Merchant Marine Act .... the relationship of employee and employer must be shown to
exist between the seaman and owner .. "); In re Falkiner, 716 F. Supp. 895, 902 (E.D.
Va. 1988) ("In order for the plaintiffs to have owed the claimants a warranty of seawor-
thiness, the claimants must have been within an employee-employer relationship with
the plaintiffs and to [sic] have been 'seamen.' "); Heath v. American Sail Training Ass'n,
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The court dismissed this argument as not only unsound but also, as
far as the Fifth Circuit was concerned, "two cases too late."13 2
Webb and its immediate progeny placed most commercial fish-
ing operations well within the definition of an employer-employee
relationship.' 3 3 Fishing boat owners seeking to avoid employment
tax requirements had to surrender virtually all control of their ves-
sels to their captains and crews. Those who did not surrender con-
trol could expect their claims for employment tax refunds to be met
with responses not unlike that of ChiefJudge Brown in Bishop: "On
the saline standards of maritime law-the common law of the sea-
the shipowners retained significant control and the master and crew
members are his employees for life, death and taxes."13 4
Thus, within the commercial fishing industry a degree of rela-
tive certainty had been achieved in the determination of the
employer-employee relationship.1 35 Understandably, fishing boat
owners preferred the uncertainty of the status quo ante to employ-
ment tax liability. But at least for the moment, the IRS had seized
the day.
644 F. Supp. 1459, 1468 (D. R.I. 1986) ("That an employer-employee relationship is
essential to recovery under the Jones Act cannot be gainsaid."); Solet v. M/V Capt. H.V.
Dufrene, 303 F. Supp. 980, 982 n.1 (E.D. La. 1969) ("For [a seaman] to recover from
[the vessel owner] under the Jones Act an employer-employee relationship must exist
132 Bishop, 476 F.2d at 979. The court of appeals was referring to its decisions in
Webb II and Anderson.
133 For a rare example of a case holding fishermen not to be employees under the
maritime standard, see Carolina Seafoods, Inc. v. United States, 581 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir.
1978). This case is of little use to most commercial fishermen, however, because of its
unique factual circumstances. The "fishermen" involved were oyster pickers who oper-
ated out of flat bottom boats, commonly called "bateaux," in wetlands along the South
Carolina coast.
134 Bishop, 476 F.2d at 980. Brown's allusion, of course, is to Benjamin Franklin's oft
quoted statement: "But in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and
taxes." Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy, Nov. 13, 1789, reprinted
in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 218 (3d ed. 1980).
135 This statement is less applicable to the situation outside the maritime context, as
evidenced by the continuous flow of commentaries regarding the ongoing employee-
independent contractor dilemma. See Gary P. Amaon & Robert E. Hyde, Planning Can
Prevent Reclassification of Independent Contractors to Employees, 42 TAx'N FOR ACCT. 96 (1989);
William J. Falk & Randy L. Gegelman, Defending Employee vs. Independent Contractor Issues,
71 J. TAx'N 380 (1989); Nicholas J. Fiore, Employee or Contractor?, 167J. AccT. 12 (1989);
Madlyn Harrell, Employees vs. Independent Contractors, 20 TAx ADVISER 425 (1989); William
Kenny & Myron Hulen, Determining Employee or Independent Contractor Status, 20 TAX AD-
VISER 661 (1989); Ronald M. Meneo, The Wage Tax Corner: Employee vs. Independent Con-
tractor Status, 12 REV. TAx'N INDIVIDUALS 149 (1988); Sharon L. Simmons, Determining
Status as an Employee: Rev. Ruling 87-41, 5 AKRON TAxJ. 255 (1988); Alan R. Sumutka &
Monique Bonnier, Independent Contractor or Employee?, 59 CPAJ. 54 (1989).
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IV
THE TAx REFORM AcT OF 1976
In 1976, not long after the post-Webb squall had blown through
the courts, a development on the legislative front rendered the
Treasury Department's apparent victory somewhat hollow. Recog-
nizing the difficulties facing fishing boat operators in the area of em-
ployment taxes, 136 Congress added sections 3121(b)(20)13 7 and
3401 (a)(17)138 to the Internal Revenue Code in the Tax Reform Act
of 1976.139 These changes provided that crew members on fishing
boats were to be classified as self-employed for purposes of income
tax withholding, FICA, and FUTA, provided certain conditions were
met. 140
The Joint Committee on Taxation identified the informal man-
ner in which the fishing industry conducted its business as one of
136 "The difficulty in maintaining necessary records and in withholding appropriate
taxes under the informal arrangements used in the industry made it almost impossible
for boat operators-particularly small operators-to comply with [the employment tax]
provisions." Karin B. Littlejohn &J.W. Looney, Handling the Special Tax Treatment Avail-
able for Fishermen and Fish Farmers, 58 J. TAX'N 360, 362 (1983).
137 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1207(e)(1)(A), 90 Stat. 1520, 1706-07 (1976) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 3121 (b) (20) (1988)). "For purposes of this chapter, the term 'em-
ployment' . . . shall not include...
(20) service... performed by an individual on a boat engaged in catch-
ing fish or other forms of aquatic animal life under an arrangement with
the owner or operator of such boat pursuant to which-
(A) such individual does not receive any cash remuneration (other than
as provided in subparagraph (B)),
(B) such individual receives a share of the boat's (or the boats' in the case
of a fishing operation involving more than one boat) catch of fish or other
forms of aquatic animal life,
(C) the amount of such individual's share depends on the amount of the
boat's (or the boats' in the case of a fishing operation involving more than
one boat) catch of fish or other forms of aquatic animal life, but only if
the operating crew of such boat (or each boat from which the individual
receives a share in the case of a fishing operation involving more than one
boat) is normally made up of fewer than 10 individuals.
Id.
138 I.R.C. § 3401(a)(17) (1976) ("For purposes of this chapter, the term 'wages'...
shall not include remuneration paid-(17) for service described in section
3121(b)(20)."). In 1981, a similar provision was added to the income tax withholding
provisions. Congress later enacted a provision which stated: "For purposes of this
chapter, the term 'employment' [does not include] ... (18) service described in section
3121(b)(20)." Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 822(a), 95 Stat. 351 (1981) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 3306(c)(18) (1981)).
139 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). Section 1207(f)(4) of the Act, 90 Stat.
1520, 1708-09 (1976), made the amendment retroactive and applicable to taxable years
after 1971. "The purpose of the retroactive provisions was not to give boat operators a
windfall but to forestall bankruptcies which might result from vigorous enforcement of
unpaid assessments." Fj. O'Hara & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 562 F. Supp. 100, 102
(D. Mass. 1983).
140 See supra note 137.
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the primary reasons for these changes.1 4 1 Traditional arrangements
made it "difficult and impractical for the boat operator to keep the
necessary records to calculate his tax obligations as an employer,
and . .. equally difficult for him to withhold the appropriate taxes
for payment."'142 Congress felt that individual crew members could
calculate and report their own income for tax purposes much more
simply and conveniently than could boat owners.' 43
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 did not change the standard by
which fishermen were classified for tax purposes; the maritime stan-
dard enunciated by Webb and its progeny remained intact. Rather,
the Act provided an exemption for certain fishing operations that
would otherwise be treated as employment relationships under the
maritime standard. Thus, when trying to determine whether an
employer-employee relationship existed between a fishing boat
owner and his captain and crewmen, courts faced two separate in-
quiries: (1) whether there had been "[a] nearly total relinquish-
ment of control through a bareboat, or demise, charter"; 44 and
(2) in the absence of such a demise, whether the fishing operation
nevertheless came within the exemption of section 3121(b)(20). 145
141 "A number of sections of the Code... were amended to accomplish ... legisla-
tive recognition of the realities... of the fishing industry." H.C. Cook,Jr. et al., Shipping
and Fishing Industries Are Affected by Tax Reform Act of 1976, 46J. TAX'N 88, 91 (1977).
The crews that work on boats used in fishing and similar pursuits, such as
taking shrimp and lobsters, are frequently 'pickup' crews composed of
individuals who may work for only a few voyages, and sometimes even for
only one voyage. In some cases, the boat operator may select his crew
from individuals found waiting on the dock in the morning. In still other
cases, small boats may be operated by relatives, no one of whom is con-
sidered the boat operator, 'captain,' or even the crew's leader. Thus, the
voyage partakes more of the nature of a joint venture than it does of an
employment situation.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT Or 1976, at 380-81, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (vol. 2) 1, 392-93. For
more information on the traditional arrangements within the fishing industry, see gener-
ally PETER B. DOERINGER Er" AL., THE NEW ENGLAND FISHING ECONOMY: JOBS, INCOME,
AND KINSHIP (1986).
142 GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, supra note 141, at 380-
81. "'Often ... the boat operator himself is likely to be an individual who has worked as
a fisherman throughout his career, and who is unaccustomed to keeping records of any
type, especially the type required under the tax rules for employers." Id. at 381. "In ...
New Bedford, privately held, family-controlled corporations most commonly own one or
more boats, with family members working as captains and filling some of the crew sites."
MARGARET E. DEWAR, INDUSTRY IN TROUBLE: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE NEW
ENGLAND FISHERIES 29 (1983).
143 GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, supra note 141, at 381.
144 United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 192 (1970).
145 See, e.g., Isbell Enter. v. United States, No. B-79-141, (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 1982)
(LEXIS Genfed library, Dist. file) (holding that the fishermen were employees and that
the § 3121 (b)(20) exemption did not apply).
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The first of these inquiries is identical to that undertaken by the
post-Webb courts. 146 The second, involving the application of the
criteria set forth in section 3121(b)(20), represents the principal
source of remaining uncertainty in the classification of fishermen for
employment tax purposes, and is the center of the current contro-
versy in New Bedford, Massachusetts. 147
V
THE PREsENT DIsPuTE
A. The IRS Casts Its Net
In the 1970s the IRS dramatically changed its enforcement pol-
icy. 148 It rewrote the Internal Revenue Manual to provide the
ground rules for in-depth employment tax audits,1 49 and it trained
agents to embark upon a vigorous enforcement policy. 150 The rea-
sons for this sudden change are not entirely dear, but it is no doubt
attributable in some degree to the IRS's belief that wide-scale abuse
of withholding duties existed at the time. 15 1
For fishermen faced with this swell of enforcement activity, the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 acted as a breakwater. Though the Treas-
ury sought to include fishermen within the definition of em-
ployee, 152 the Act accomplished the opposite result by explicitly
excluding most of them from it. 15 3 To add insult to the Treasury's
146 See supra notes 109-25 and accompanying text.
147 [Ihe [IRS] has informed the [New Bedford] fishing industry that past
practices with respect to the method by which wages are paid to crew-
members do not satisfy the Service's interpretation of Section 3121 and,
consequently, certain fishermen traditionally treated as self-employed,
are being considered as employees of the fishing vessel.
Letter from Representatives Brian J. Donnelly and Gerry E. Studds to Commissioner
Lawrence B. Gibbs, Internal Revenue Service 2 (Feb. 22, 1989) (on file with author).
148 Flynn, supra note 16, at 915; North, supra note 67, at 794.
149 I.R.S., News Release No. IR-1868 at 3 (Aug. 6, 1977) (speech by Commissioner
Kurtz before the A.B.A.).
150 North, supra note 67, at 795. Some commentators observed, "The IRS has found
this a profitable area in which to delve, and as a result it recently instituted a new pro-
gram of establishing groups of employment tax specialists whose sole duty is to audit
employment tax returns." Banks & Brescher, supra note 16, at 286.
151 B. John Williams, Jr., How to Alleviate Tax Burden When IRS Claims That Indepenlent
Contractors are Employers, 6 TAX'N FOR LAw. 364, 364 (1978); see North, supra note 67, at
791, stating:
While the Court's decision [in Webb was] relatively narrow in application,
one cannot help but wonder if the language of the ... opinion deem-
phasizing the requirement that the owner 'control' the details of the
crew's work encouraged the IRS to reexamine its enforcement policy and
its own view of the employer-employee relation ....
152 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
153 This protection, of course, was conditioned upon satisfaction of the require-
ments set forth in I.R.C. § 3121(b)(20).
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injury,154 Congress enacted section 530 of the Revenue Act of
1978155 to stem the tide of increased enforcement activity. Section
530 terminated the pre-1979 employment tax liabilities of taxpayers
who had a "reasonable basis" for not treating their workers as em-
ployees. In addition, it extended the relief from employment taxes
through 1979 for taxpayers who (1) had a "reasonable basis" for
not treating their workers as employees, and (2) had not treated
their workers as employees during 1978. Finally, it imposed a two-
year moratorium on the issuance of regulations and revenue rulings
that address the employment tax status of workers.1 56
Once again, Congress's reluctance to expand the definition of
employee for tax purposes had nullified the IRS's efforts to claim
the fishing industry as its prize. As subsequent events illustrate,
however, the IRS had "not yet begun to fight."'1 5 7
B. The Port of New Bedford
Since colonial times, the fishing industry has played a vital
role in the livelihood of Massachusetts. 5 8 In no place has this
dependence upon the sea been greater than in the port of New Bed-
ford, nestled in the southeast corner of the state. In the early nine-
teenth century, while Boston, Marblehead, and Gloucester became
home to the newly enshrined cod fishery,' 59 New Bedford, located
fifty miles to the south, acquired global prominence in whaling. Fol-
154 The Treasury Department lost an estimated $13 million annually in revenues.
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, supra note 141, at 383.
155 Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-86 (1978).
156 Fred Luyties, New Relief When IRS Contends Independent Contractors Were Employees,
22 TAx'N FOR AcCT. 324, 324 (1979). For additional discussion of the Revenue Act of
1978, see Banks & Clark, supra note 19; David R. Frazer & Yale F. Goldberg, Independent
Contractor Status: Leading Up to 1978 Revenue Act Changes and Beyond, 57 TAXES 374 (1979);
Timothy J. McCormally, Interim Relief of 1978 Act Will Terminate Pre-1980 Employment Tax
Liabilities for Many, 50 J. TAx'N 224 (1979).
157 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 283 (3d ed. 1980) (quotingJohn Paul
Jones).
158 On March 17, 1784, Mr. John Rowe arose from his seat in the Representatives'
Hall of the Old Massachusetts State House and offered the following motion: "That
leave might be given to hang up the representation of a Codfish in the room where the
House sit, as a memorial of the importance of the Cod-Fishery to the welfare of [the]
Commonwealth .. " Leave was granted, and the five-foot wooden emblem presented
by Rowe was put in place. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSA-
CHUSETrS: 1783-1860, at 134 (1921). After following the Great and General Court to
Beacon Hill in 1798, the "Sacred Cod," as it has come to be known, has faced the
Speaker's desk to this day. MatthewJ. Rita, Trawling for Hope 10 (1989) (unpublished
B.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). See also Edward R. Ricciuti, Cod and
Man, OCEANS 42 (1986) (describing the significance of the cod fishery to the state of
Massachusetts). For other interesting background reading on the role of the fisheries in
the region's history, see generally EDWARD A. ACKERMAN, NEW ENGLAND'S FISHING IN-
DUSTRY (1941); MORISON, supra.
159 See supra note 158.
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lowing the War of 1812, during which Nantucket lost half of its
whaling fleet, the city of New Bedford assumed the role of whaling
capital of the world. By 1830, New Bedford's fleet was double that
of Nantucket's, with 120 square-rigged ships importing 41,444 bar-
rels of sperm oil and 43,145 barrels of whale oil that year.' 60
Twenty-five years later close to half of the American whaling fleet
called New Bedford its home port-a whaling force of 329 whalers
and 10,000 seamen.' 6 ' So complete was New Bedford's supremacy
that during the 1850s more whaling vessels sailed out of its harbor
than the combined total of all the other seaports in the world. 162
The discovery of petroleum in Pennsylvania in 1859, coupled
with a depletion of the whale population, sounded the death knell
for the New Bedford whaling industry. Nevertheless, the city re-
mained focused on the sea, and by the early twentieth century a
thriving fishing industry began to take hold. For immigrants coming
to the New World with their own maritime heritage-Irish, Portu-
guese, Scandinavians, Italians, and others-the fishing industry pro-
vided an opportunity to live a life similar to that of their ancestors.
This influx of labor, along with ever-improving fishing technologies,
set the New Bedford fishing industry on a course of success that
would last for almost forty years.' 63
The modem era of the New Bedford fishing industry, while rel-
atively prosperous for some, has of late been subject to a number of
environmental, economic, and political adversities.}64 Like the
whaling industry before it, the fishing industry has witnessed a dras-
tic depletion in its stocks. Overfishing by both foreign 65 and do-
mestic fleets during the 1960s and 1970s reduced the once
flourishing groundfish and shellfish populations of Georges Bank to
dangerously low levels. Despite the imposition of a 200-mile limit in
160 Rita, supra note 158, at 11.
161 Id.
162 Id. Perhaps the most famous of all whaling barks associated with New Bedford
was the ill-fated "Pequod." See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (1851).
163 Rita, supra note 158, at 11-14.
164 For an overview of these adversities, see Jerry Ackerman, Deep Trouble, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1987 (Magazine), at 16. A more in-depth examination of the New Eng-
land fishing industry's dire straits is found in DEWAR, supra note 142.
165 During a 20-year period, over 1000 ships from 16 different countries took over
72 billion pounds of fish away from North American waters. Between 1968 and 1974,
the height of the foreign effort, the yearly catches reported by these vessels (the actual
figures may have been higher) consistently exceeded 12 million tons-10 times the New
England landings. Rita, supra note 158, at 16.
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1976,166 depletion of fishing stocks continues to be a problem,
largely because of the industry's tremendous growth.' 67
It is against this backdrop of tough times for the fishing indus-
try that recent IRS activity in New Bedford has taken place. In the
face of legislative headwinds, the Service has changed course, and
once again has set its sights on the elusive goal of classifying com-
mercial fishermen as employees.
C. Section 3121(b)(20): Cause For a Modem Day Tea
Party? 168
Under section 3121(b) (20)169 and the related provisions in the
regulations, 170 crewmen are considered self-employed for employ-
ment tax purposes 171 if they meet three requirements. They must
(1) be part of a crew of fewer than ten crewmen, (2) work on a boat
engaged in taking fish or other aquatic animal life, and (3) receive
as remuneration a share of the boat's catch or a share of the
proceeds of the catch. At first glance, these requirements seem rela-
tively straightforward and not susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions. But in early 1988, the IRS began to conduct an extensive
project audit of New Bedford boat owners' compliance with federal
employment tax laws from March 31, 1985 to December 31, 1987.
166 Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811-13 (1976).
167 Today, New Bedford has a commercial fishing fleet of about 300 draggers and
scallopers. Natalie White, "These People, They Come Hungry, " THE STANDARD-TIMES (New
Bedford), Apr. 16, 1989 (Magazine), at 10.
The "tragedy of the commons" concept captures the fundamental problem facing
resource management in the fishing industry: in trying to maximize his individual gain
in a world with limited recourses, a fisherman is locked into a system that compels him
to increase his fishing effort without limit. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
168 In May of 1773, the British Parliament passed a new law allowing the direct
importation of tea into the American colonies. The Tea Act of 1773, 13 Geo. 3, ch. 44
(1773). The measure lowered the price of tea, but retained a tax which had been
imposed without the colonists' consent. The Townshend Revenue Act, 7 Geo. 3, ch. 46
(1767) (placing a duty of three pence per pound on all tea imported into the colonies).
On the evening of December 16, 1773, a group of Boston patriots protested by throwing
342 chests of tea into the harbor, during what has come to be known as the Boston Tea
Party. WESLEY S. GRISWOLD, THE NIGHT THE REVOLLrrioN BEGAN 93-106 (1972). For a
comprehensive account of the event, see BENJAMIN WOODS LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA
PARTY (1964). Although such an uprising is highly unlikely today, the sentiment of the
taxpayers in the present dispute is not unlike that of their colonial predecessors.
169 I.R.C. § 3121(b)(20) (1988). For the text of § 3121(b)(20), see supra note 137.
170 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(20)-I (1980).
171 Note that even if the conditions of § 3121(b) (20) are met, a fisherman may never-
theless be considered an employee for purposes other than employment taxes. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 79-101, 1979-1 C.B. 156 (holding that crew members within the § 3121(b)(20)
exemption were employees for purposes of determining whether an employee's pen-
sion, annuity, profit sharing, or stock bonus plan was qualified under § 401 of the Inter-
n.Al Revenue Code).
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The Service assessed sizable tax deficiencies, basing its position on
interpretations of two elements of the section 3121(b)(20)
requirements. 1 7 2
1. How Often is "Normally"?
The threshold criterion of the section 3121 (b) (20) exemption is
that the operating crew of the fishing boat "normally [be] made up of
fewer than 10 individuals."'' 7 3 Fishing boat owners have construed
the word "normally" to reflect their understanding of its most com-
mon usage. 174 In their minds, they are not employers of the fisher-
men who work on their boats as long as the crew numbers less than
ten men "on the average over the taxpayer's year."' 75
In a 1982 private letter ruling involving the very same issue, 176
the IRS stated its position at the time:
We agree that since the word "normally" was not defined in the
statute or explained in the legislative history of the provision, the
word should if feasible be read in its ordinary and commonly used
sense. The common, ordinary meaning of the word, when used as
a quantitative measurement, is the statistical norm, median, mean
or average, as determined over a specified period of time. 177
In the same ruling, the IRS determined that the calendar quarter
was the proper time period over which the term "normally" was to
be applied when referring to crew size: "It is reasonable to presume
that the legislators intended a workable test, one that could be ap-
plied by the average boat operator to determine with certainty
whether or not the tax in question is payable."' 78 Although this def-
inition of the word "normally" seems pertinent to the present dis-
pute, the IRS did not give it publicity or precedential force by
issuing it as a public statement or revenue ruling.179 Nevertheless,
the IRS maintains that since employment tax returns for FICA and
income tax withholding must be filed quarterly, 80 "it appears rea-
172 See White, supra note 4, at Al.
173 I.R.C. § 3121(b)(20) (1988) (emphasis added). See also Treas. Reg. § 31.3121
(b)(20)-l (using the identical language).
174 White, supra note 4, at Al.
175 136 CONG. REc. S4273 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1990) (statement of Sen.John F. Kerry
(D-Mass.)) (emphasis added).
176 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-39-046 (June 29, 1982).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1988) ("Unless the Secretary otherwise establishes by
regulations, a written determination may not be used or cited as precedent.").
180 Treas. Reg. § 31.6011(a)-I (1976). FUTA returns must also be filed quarterly,
unless the total FUTA tax liability, including undeposited amounts from prior quarters,
is less than $100. Treas. Reg. § 31.6302(c)-3 (1984).
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sonable that a determination of whether a liability for FICA and in-
come tax withholding exists would have to be made quarterly."''
2. The "Pers" Issue
The other criterion of the section 3121 (b) (20) exemption inter-
preted by the IRS is the requirement that remuneration paid to the
boat's crew members constitute "a share of the boat's ... catch of
fish ... or a share of the proceeds from the sale of such catch."1' 8 2
Thus, the amount of an individual fisherman's share must depend
solely on the amount of the boat's catch.183 Unlike the definition of
the word "normally," the IRS made its position on this criterion
quite clear in a revenue ruling.1 84
Traditionally, commercial fishermen have operated on a joint
venture or "sharecropping" basis.1 85 Under this system, the catch
of each trip-or, more typically, the proceeds from the sale of the
catch-are divided among the boat owner, the captain, and the crew
members.' 86 One of the most common arrangements allocates 60%
181 Letter from Bob O'Connell, District Director of Internal Revenue, to Lourie &
Cutler, P.C. (Jan. 4, 1989) (on file with author).
182 I.R.C. § 3121(b)(20)(A), (B) (1988). See also Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(20)-
1 (a) (i), (iii) (1980) (containing substantially similar language).
183 I.R.C. § 3121(b)(20)(C) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(20)-l(a)(ii) (1980).
184 Rev. Rul. 77-102, 1977-1 C.B. 299. This Revenue Ruling held that none of the
services of the mate, engineer, and cook of a fishing boat who are paid an amount in
addition to a share of the catch, or crew members entitled to hourly pay for repair of
nets and other incidental work while the boat is in port, are excepted from employment
under § 3121(b)(20). Id.
185 Littlejohn & Looney, supra note 136, at 362. "The operation of fishing vessels
under agreements, or lays, so called, for sharing the proceeds of the catch, has been
familiar to those engaged in the business and to the courts for more than a century ....
Cromwell v. Slaney, 65 F.2d 940, 941 (1st Cir. 1933).
186 The size of the share, or "lay," received by each party may vary depending upon
the port and the particular arrangements made among the parties. See Williams Packing
& Navigation Co. v. Enochs, 176 F. Supp. 168, 171 (S.D. Miss. 1959) ("It has been the
custom on the Coast of Mississippi since the seafood packing industry started that fish-
ing vessels have operated upon a lay or share basis, but the details of this customary way
varied .... ). See also The Carrier Dove, 97 F. 111, 112 (1st Cir. 1899) (shipmaster, who
was also part owner of the fishing vessel, chartered it from his co-owners for a voyage on
the "quarter clear lay"); Brown v. Hicks, 24 F. 811, 812 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885) (shipmaster
contracted with the owner for "the one-fifteenth lay or share of the net proceeds of the
cargo" obtained by a New Bedford whaling bark); Coffin v.Jenkins, 5 F. Cas. 1188, 1190
(D. Mass. 1844) (No. 2,948) ("Th[e] lay or share. . . is in the nature of wages for seamen
... and is governed by the same rules."); Reed v. Hussey, 20 F. Cas. 440, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
1836) (No. 11,646) ("Agreements by which seamen are to participate in the adventure,
and to derive their reward from its success, . . . are ... limited ... to privateering and
fishing voyages."). In United States v. Laflin, 24 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1928), the court
stated:
It has been the maritime law from the time of Oleron that agreements, by
which seamen, engaged in a fishing or whaling voyage, are to receive for
their services shares of the profits of the voyage, are contracts of hiring,
and the shares so agreed upon are in the nature of wages ....
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of the net stock to the crew and 40% to the owner, with the captain
receiving 10% of the owner's share, in addition to his share as a
member of the crew.' 8 7
In and of itself, this share, or "lay," system is compatible with
the requirement of section 3121 (b) (20), since the share received by
each fisherman is based solely upon a percentage of the catch.188 In
New Bedford and other ports, however, it has long been the custom
to pay a small amount of compensation to the mate, cook, and engi-
neer, over and above their normal share.' 8 9 These "pers," as they
are called, are de minimis amounts given in recognition of the serv-
ices which those persons perform at sea in addition to their normal
responsibilities as crew members. 190 Prior to 1982, a per in New
Bedford had been a flat amount of twenty-five dollars for each trip.
In 1982, in order to ensure compliance with section 3121(b)(20),
fishermen began to calculate the amount of a per in accordance with
a "sliding scale" based on the gross sales proceeds of a catch. 19 1
During the four years following adoption of the sliding scale,
the IRS audited the tax returns of several fishing boat owners in
New Bedford. 192 In none of these audits did the IRS allege that a
vessel owner was required to withhold employment taxes from the
compensation paid to crew members who received pers. 193 But in
its most recent audit project, the IRS denied having approved of the
use of the sliding scale: "Since the industry has chosen to adopt a
method of payment that is not in compliance with the law, the em-
187 DEWAR, supra note 142, at 28-29.
188 Thus, in the event of an unsuccessful trip, the captain or crew have no guarantee
that they will be compensated. When a boat is unable to catch enough fish to cover
expenses, the trip is often referred to as a "broker." Cf Star Fish & Oyster Co. v. United
States, 223 F. Supp. 402,405 (S.D. Ala. 1963) (identifying a Gulf Coast custom of paying
the captain and crew a token amount in the event of a "broker.").
189 "These token payments, called 'pers' in Massachusetts, are customary in the in-
dustry nationwide." 136 CONG. REC. S4273 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1990) (statement of Sena-
torJohn F. Kerry (D-Mass.)).
190 Courts have long recognized this fishing industry practice. See, e.g., The Met-
tacomet, 230 F. 308, 309 (D. Mass. 1915) ("It is customary in the fishing business for
cooks to be paid ['a share and an extra']." (emphasis added)).
191 This schedule calculated the per according to a percentage of the gross pro-
ceeds. Its use was intended not to change the amount of a per, but to preserve the
exemption of § 3121(b)(20). According to the attorneys for the boat owners:
[I]n 1982, a representative of the Internal Revenue Service came to New
Bedford and met with ... boat owners ... for the purpose of giving them
assistance to comply with the new rules. The evidence indicates that this
representative did, in fact, acknowledge [that] the sliding scale would be
in accordance with the new tax law.
Letter from Daniel D. Levenson, Lourie & Cutler, P.C. to Bob O'Connell, District Direc-
tor of Internal Revenue (Dec. 12, 1988) (on file with author).
192 Id.
193 Id. Also, in none of these prior audits did the Service assert that the owners were
misinterpreting the word "normally" in calculating their crew sizes.
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ployees are not exempted from FICA and income tax withholding.
Therefore, it is not unfair for the Internal Revenue Service to expect
the resulting tax liability to be paid."1 94 Disagreement over this lat-
ter assertion, coupled with the conflicting interpretations of the
word "normally," has shifted the focus of this dispute from New
Bedford harbor to the shores of the Potomac, where each side hopes
its views will prevail.
VI
PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION
A. A Legislative Rescue?
As mentioned at the outset, if the IRS prevails in this dispute,
many of the boat owners involved could go out of business. 195 Rec-
ognizing the adverse impact such a result would have on their state's
already ailing fishing industry, Massachusetts congressional repre-
sentatives have sought to resolve the dispute in favor of the owners.
In the Fall of 1989, Representative BrianJ. Donnelly, a member
of the House Committee on Ways and Means, unsuccessfully at-
tempted to offer an amendment to the 1990 budget legislation.' 9 6
The amendment would have directed the IRS to calculate the aver-
age number of crew members per vessel on a yearly-as opposed to
a quarterly-basis; allowed a vessel owner to continue the practice
of paying de minimis "pers" without jeopardizing the recipients'
self-employed status; and required the IRS to apply these two rules
retroactively.' 9 7
Representative Donnelly's plan to rescind the IRS interpreta-
tion of section 3121(b)(20) received an apparent boost in October
of 1989, when Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, stated that the Treasury did not object to the basic propo-
sal.' 98 Significantly, however, the agency did object to making the
changes retroactive.' 99 Ultimately, lawmakers were unable to attach
the measure to the deficit reduction bill that passed during the final
194 Letter from Bob O'Connell, District Director of Internal Revenue, to Daniel D.
Levenson, Lourie & Cutler, P.C. (Jan. 4, 1989) (on file with author).
195 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
196 Representative Donnelly described the amendment's fate to Massachusetts State
Senator William Q. MacLean, Jr.: "Unfortunately, the amendment... was not in order
under the bizarre rules under which our Committee was operating." Letter from Repre-
sentative Brian J. Donnelly to State Senator William Q. MacLean, Jr. (Oct. 3, 1989) (on
file with author).
197 Letter from State Senator William Q. MacLean, Jr. to Representative Brian J.
Donnelly (Sept. 14, 1989) (on file with author).
198 Glass, supra note 4, at BI.
199 Id.
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days of Congress, 200 and the IRS moved ahead with its plans to col-
lect the back taxes. 20
On April 5, 1990, Senator John F. Kerry introduced a bill to
resolve the dispute.20 2 In substance, the proposed legislation would
have amended section 3121 (b) (20) of the Internal Revenue Code by
striking "fewer than 10" and inserting "10 or fewer." 203 In addi-
tion, the bill would have amended section 3121(b) (20) (A) to read as
follows:
such individual does not receive any cash remuneration other
than as provided in subparagraph (B) and other than cash
remuneration-
(i) which does not exceed $100 per trip,
(ii) which is contingent on a minimum catch, and
(iii) which is paid solely for additional duties (such as mate, engi-
neer, or cook) for which additional cash remuneration is tradi-
tional in the industry.2 °4
Only the latter amendment would have been retroactive.20 5
Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, made a commitment to Senator Kerry that, if given a chance,
he would address the matter in a tax bill later in the year.206 As the
session drew to a close, however, the Senate had taken no action on
the legislation, and the attention of the boat owners shifted to the
other side of the Capitol.
In April of 1990, Representative Donnelly introduced similar
legislation in the House.20 7 Although he was unable to add it to the
budget bill, the House Committee on Ways and Means acted on the
proposed legislation favorably and allowed it to reach the floor.208
On October 27, 1990, the last day of the session, this- legislation
200 Pamela Glass, IRS: Boatowners Owe $10 Million in Payroll Taxes, THE STANDARD-
TIMES (New Bedford), Mar. 13, 1990, at B7.
201 In a letter to SenatorJohn F. Kerry (D-Mass.), David G. Blattner, the IRS's Assis-
tant Commissioner, asserted: "Our examiners have long standing law and published
rulings on which to base their conclusions .... For this reason we feel that suspension
of audit activity in this area of tax law is not warranted." Id.
202 S. 2448, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
203 1&J § l(a)(1).
204 Id. § l(b)(1).
205 Id. § 1(c)(2).
206 Pamela Glass, New Hope Offered to End City Fleet's Tax Dispute, THE STANDARD-TIMES
(New Bedford), Sept. 14, 1990, at B8.
207 H.R. 4468, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The only difference between the
House and Senate versions was that the latter provided for a $100 limit on additional
cash remuneration, S. 2448 § l(b)(1)(A)(i), while the former allowed for only $50. H.R.
4468 § l(b)(1)(A)(i).
208 136 CONG. REC. H12,347 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Brian J.
Donnelly (D-Mass.)).
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sailed through the House, 20 9 but ran aground in the Senate in the
early hours of the following morning.210
Representative Gerry Studds, buoyed by the overwhelming
support the measure received, announced that he would bring it
before Congress again. 211 Representative Dan Rostenkowski,
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, assured
Studds that he would ask the IRS to discontinue activity in the New
Bedford case until Congress had a chance to act on appropriate leg-
islation.2 12 To date, however, Congress has enacted no legislation
on the matter. 213
B. Batten Down the Hatches: Litigation Lies Ahead
While the fishing boat owners await the winds of legislative
change to blow in their favor, they have begun yet another voyage
through the courts. On June 25, 1990, attorneys for the New Bed-
ford boat owners214 filed a complaint against the IRS in the United
States Claims Court.215 The named plaintiffs in the case are Fla-
mingo Fishing Corp., L&H Fishing Corp., and Pitriz Fishing Co.,
Inc., each of which operates a fishing vessel out of New Bedford. 216
209 The bill was the only tax-related bill to make it through the House of Represent-
atives in two years, with the exception of the recent budget package. Natalie White,
Studds Gets Help to Stop IRS in Fishing Fleet Case, THE STANDARD-TIMES (New Bedford),
Oct. 31, 1990, at C7.
210 A bill [that would have resolved the dispute] passed the House of Repre-
sentatives but was struck down in the Senate . . . when Sen. Bob
Packwood, R-Ore., put a hold on it. The maneuver bewildered Rep.
Studds, who said Sen. Packwood has supported efforts to stop the IRS
from making the collection until Congress had resolved the dispute.
Natalie White, Bid to Stop Collection of Back Taxes Fails, THE STANDARD-TIMES (New Bed-
ford), Oct. 29, 1990, at A6.
211 Id. Originally, the matter was to be raised in January of 1991. However, the
outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf necessitated a realignment of congressional priori-
ties. Several months later Representatives Studds and Donnelly introduced the legisla-
tion again. Pamela Glass, Bill Again Proposed to Resolve Dispute Over Taxing Fishermen, THE
STANDARD-TIMES (New Bedford), May 2, 1991, at B8.
212 White, supra note 209.
213 In the meantime, the IRS has placed liens on many of the New Bedford boats,
pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6321-6323 (1988). See, e.g., Notice of Federal Tax Lien Under
Internal Revenue Laws, Form 668(Y), delivered to Sylvia R Fishing Corp. (July 17, 1990)
(on file with author).
214 The boat owners have enlisted the aid of Lourie & Cutler, P.C. of Boston,
Massachusetts.
215 Plaintiff's Complaint, Flamingo Fishing Corp. v. United States (Cl. Ct. filed June
25, 1990) (No. 90-578T).
216 Id. at 1-2. Flamingo Fishing Corp. operates the scalloper "Edgartown," L&H
Fishing Corp. operates the dragger "Seel," and Pitriz Fishing Co., Inc. operates the
dragger "Lady Jay." Id. at 3.
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The action is for the recovery of the FICA taxes paid by each plain-
tiff for one of its crew members.2 17
Without a legislative solution to date, the case is moving toward
trial.218 Technically, a decision by the Claims Court will affect only
the named plaintiff corporations. 219 Attorneys for the boat owners
are trying to get the IRS to agree that it will abide by the court's
decisions as to the rest of the owners.220 The boatowners' attorneys
have described how the process will become considerably more
complex and expensive if this effort proves unsuccessful.221 The
forecast of increased legal expenses only adds to the boat owners'
hope that legislation, and not litigation, will settle the dispute in
their favor.222
C. Fishing for Dollars: A Hidden IRS Agenda?
The fishing industry, because of its informal arrangements,
never has been particularly susceptible to the enforcement proce-
dures of the IRS. 223 The Service recognizes this fact, as evidenced
by its continual attempts to bring fishermen within the reach of the
employment tax provisions. 224 In creating the section 3121(b)(20)
exemption, Congress expressed its view that individual crew mem-
bers could calculate and report their own income for tax purposes
217 Id. at 1. The Court's determination of plaintiffs' liability under FICA will also
determine their liability under FUTA, and their liability for income tax withholding. Id.
at 3.
218 In March of 1991, the Claims Court (per Nettesheim, Judge) settled a discovery
dispute that arose when the IRS refused to provide documents and information pursu-
ant to the plaintiffs' requests. Flamingo Fishing Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 625
(1991). The IRS's motion for a protective order was denied with respect to all of plain-
tiffs' interrogatories, save for those which ran afoul of I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A), which pre-
vents disclosure of tax return information. Id. at 630.
219 Letter from Daniel D. Levenson and Richard B. Schafer, Lourie & Cutler, P.C.,
to Vessel Owners (July 3, 1990) (on file with author).
220 Id.
221 [W]e will have to pay the FICA tax for one employee and [sic] for one
quarter and file Claims for Refund for the remainder of our dients ....
We would then file lawsuits for each of these clients following the denial
of their respective Claims for Refund. Then the cases would be joined
together in order to bind the government to the decision of the Court
.... [It [would] mean an extraordinary commitment of our time and
expense to put all of [these] cases together.
Id.
222 Individual boat owners have been called upon periodically to make sizable con-
tributions to the Seafood Producers' Association (SPA) Legal Fund. See, e.g., Letter from
Seafood Producers' Ass'n Finance Committee to All Members of SPA Legal Fund (re-
questing $1000 from each member) (July 12, 1990). As this Note goes to press, the boat
owners have already spent approximately $400,000 in legal fees. Telephone interview
with John P. Rita, owner of the fishing vessels "Theresa R II," "Theresa," and "Odys-
sey" (Sept. 23, 1991).
223 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67, 103-04.
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much more simply and conveniently than could boat owners. 225
The added simplicity and convenience, of course, accrued to the
benefit of fishing boat owners and not to the IRS. For the Service,
"[i]t is far easier to collect tax withheld on wages from one employer
than from a multitude of self-employed individuals. " 226 Narrowing
the exemption is a means by which the IRS can simplify-and in-
crease-its enforcement of fishermen's tax liability. 227
The IRS motivation to ensure tax compliance among fishermen
is particularly strong in New Bedford, where the presence of a siza-
ble black market in undersized sea scallops acts as a drain on IRS
revenues. Some estimate that over half the scallopers in the New
Bedford fleet bring in scallops smaller than the legal limit,228 which
they sell on the black market for cash. In all likelihood, little of this
cash, commonly referred to as "shack money," is reported as
income.2 29
D. Other Ports of Call for the IRS?
Should the IRS prevail in this dispute, New Bedford fishermen
will be the first, but not necessarily the last, group of taxpayers af-
fected.230 The exemption created by section 3121(b)(20) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code applies 23 1 equally to all commercial fishermen
throughout the country. In advocating a legislative solution to the
present dispute, Massachusetts congressional representatives have
225 See supra text accompanying note 143.
226 Paul Streer & Joseph Boyd, Employee or Independent Contractor? Proposed Guidelines
May Lessen the Controversy, 56 TAxEs 489, 492 (1978).
While fishermen often stay with one boat for many trips, many do not
have obligations to a boat beyond one trip. They can take a trip off or
move among different boats within a fishery. Recommendations of
friends or relatives, a reputation as a good fisherman, and friendships
with captains have always figured in how easily a fisherman can move
from one site to another ....
DEWAR, supra note 142, at 27.
227 One commentator summarized the IRS rationale:
In addition to seeking new contributors to a financially shaky social secur-
ity system, the Service often treats the problem as one of compliance.
Many small taxpayers-certainly too numerous, and sometimes too tran-
sient, to audit-are viewed by the Service as noncompliers who will pay
their taxes only if subject to withholding. Thus, to the Service, the solu-
tion is to keep within the range of unwilling collectors businesspersons
who frequently do not feel they have enough to say concerning their
workers to play that role.
Marmoll, supra note 15, at 29-2 to 29-3.
228 Natalie White, Small Scallops Oil Wheels of Black Market, THE STANDARD-TIMES (New
Bedford), Mar. 5, 1989, at Al, A8 (referring to the "guess" of Peter Kilshaw, president
of the Offshore Mariners Association). See 50 C.F.R. pt. 650 (1989) for regulations gov-
ernng the Atlantic sea scallop fishery.
2-) See White, supra note 228.
230 See supra note 5.
231 Or does not apply, as the case may be.
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been sure to communicate this fact to their colleagues. In the Sen-
ate, SenatorJohn F. Kerry explained: "Although the [disputed IRS]
interpretation [of the Internal Revenue Code] arose in an audit of
New Bedford fishermen, the outcome will affect the fishing industry
nationwide." 232 In the House, Representative BrianJ. Donnelly ex-
pressed similar sentiments: "The IRS policy could have a chilling
effect on family fishermen all over America. If the IRS is allowed to
prevail, the future of the family fishing industry in America is in
jeopardy." 233
Other members of Congress have noted the potentially national
implications of the IRS action in New Bedford and -have joined the
Massachusetts delegation in seeking a resolution favorable to re-
gional fishing industries.23 4 This cooperation is due in large part to
a recognition that New Bedford is not the only United States fishing
port experiencing hard times. In Chesapeake Bay, 235 along the Gulf
Coast,23 6 in the Pacific Northwest,23 7 and as far north as Alaska,238
232 136 CONG. REC. S4273 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1990) (statement of Sen.John F. Kerry
(D-Mass.)).
233 136 CONG. REC. H12,347 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. BrianJ.
Donnelly (D-Mass.)). See also Glass, supra note 4, at BI ("The IRS ruling applies only to
the New Bedford fleet because of a recent audit there, but observers say boats elsewhere
could soon face the same problem.").
234 For example, in January 1990, Senators George Mitchell (D-Me.), and Bob
Packwood (R-Ore.), joined Senators John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), and Edward M. Kennedy
(D-Mass.), in writing to IRS Commissioner Fred Goldberg to request that all IRS action
against small boatowners be postponed until Congress re-examines how the tax law af-
fects the fishing industry nationwide. Glass, supra note 200, at B7.
235 The year 1988 tested the legendary endurance and know-how of Chesa-
peake Bay watermen in both Virginia and Maryland.
A combination of oyster mortality, finfish bans, poor reproduction of
certain species and unfavorable market conditions made survival a strug-
gle for many commercial watermen in the two states.
Joe Valliant, Crabs and Clams Soften Oyster Losses, 69 NAT'L FISHERMAN 1989 Y.B. 10, 10.
236 If the big news in the Southeast for 1988 was redfish closures-and it
was-then the headline stories for 1989 are likely to be tightened restric-
tions on seatrout, further regulation of reef fish or the development of a
management plan for shark.
And as if that weren't enough to threaten the business plans of the
region's fishermen, 1989 will undoubtedly bring on the full impact of cur-
rently stalled regulations involving turtle excluder devices, or TEDs.
Moreover, growing concern over finfish bycatch may well lead to more
restrictions on a shrimp industry already weakened by competition from
imports.
Russ Fee, Tuna and Butterfish Rise Sharply as Shrimp Suffers, 69 NAT'L FISHERMAN 1989 Y.B.
18, 18.
237 1988 Shrimp landings in Washington set a new high-water mark at 17.5 million
pounds. Shrimpers in Oregon landed 44.8 million pounds. Prices in both regions, how-
ever, remained down from 1987 levels. Bruce Buls, Washington & Oregon, 69 NAr'L FIsH-
ERMAN 1989 Y.B. 15, 15.
238 Many Alaskan fishermen enjoyed relative prosperity in recent years, see Terry
Johnson, Southeast &CentralAlaska, 69 NAT'L FisHERMAN 1989 Y.B. 12, 12, but the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound reversed their fortunes dramatically.
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fishermen confront difficulties that an increased tax burden will only
exacerbate.
VII
A LOOK AT THE MERrrS-THE IRS CASE DOES NOT
HOLD WATER
A. The Policy Choice: Hard Astern or Steady as She Goes?
Congress and the courts have long recognized that
"[f]ishermen are seamen, having uses and customs peculiar to their
business." 239 In the employment tax context, judicial decisions and
legislative enactments have largely reflected this fact. Since the
Webb case, courts have applied a uniquely maritime standard to em-
ployment arrangements in the fishing industry.240 In the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, Congress explicitly took notice of the realities of
the fishing industry and exempted small fishing operations from em-
ployment tax liability.24' Through a bureaucratic policy change,
however, the IRS could undermine the stated objective of Congress
and expose to employment tax liability the very individuals the ex-
emption was created to protect.
1. "Normally" For Whom?
It is an established rule of interpretation that "the legislature
must be presumed to use words in their known and ordinary signifi-
cation." 242 This rule, which applies to taxing acts, 243 has been ex-
pressed in a manner particularly relevant to the present dispute over
the proper interpretation of the word "normally":
[T]he plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to
be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing
but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an
acute and powerful intellect would discover.244
As the IRS has acknowledged, neither the Tax Reform Act of
1976 nor its legislative history provides any explanation of the term
"normally." 245 Similarly, none of the regulations enacted pursuant
239 The Carrier Dove, 97 F. 11I, 112 (1st Cir. 1899).
240 See supra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
242 Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932); see also Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) ("[T]he words of statutes-including revenue
acts-should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses.").
243 Old Colony, 284 U.S. at 560.
244 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925).
245 See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
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to the Act supply any guidance. 246 The disagreement, then, con-
cerns how the word is best understood in its known and ordinary
sense.
247
On its face, the IRS interpretation of "normally" is not without
merit. Determining compliance with the conditions of section
3121(b)(20) on a quarterly basis corresponds with quarterly filing
requirements. 248 Since the creation of the employment tax exemp-
tion in 1976, however, the IRS has taken no action to make this in-
terpretation of "normally" binding upon commercial fishermen. 249
Moreover, the IRS did not raise this issue during previous audits of
New Bedford boat owners. 250
In the absence of authoritative guidance on the proper time pe-
riod to apply, boat owners have interpreted the word "normally" in
its "ordinary, everyday sense[].1 251 But what is considered "ordi-
nary" and "everyday" for fishermen necessarily takes into account
the realities of their profession. The fishing industry's labor de-
mands fluctuate markedly, depending on seasonal and weather con-
ditions. In general, the crew size on a fishing boat is larger during
the warmer parts of the year, when stocks are more plentiful and
fishing conditions more favorable. Conversely, a crew will typically
carry fewer men during the winter months. In addition, at any time
of year, a stretch of particularly poor weather can affect the size of a
crew, as well as the number and duration of the crew's trips. For
these reasons, boat owners have assumed that the most logical pe-
riod of time over which the term "normally" can be applied is the
four consecutive calendar quarters prior to the quarter examined.
In weighing the relative merits of these competing interpreta-
tions, one must refer to the statutory context in which the word
"normally" appears. While Congress provided no guidance for in-
terpreting the term in section 3121(b)(20),2 52 the legislative history
of that section clearly expressed the policy underlying its enact-
246 It is also worth noting that the word has never been defined in any edition of the
IRS's Tax Guide for Commercial Fishermen. INTERNAL; REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 595, TAx
GUIDE FOR COMMERICAL FISHERMAN.
247 More specifically, the disagreement concerns the time period over which the av-
erage crew size is to be determined.
248 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
249 Recall that the private letter ruling in which the IRS interpretation appeared has
no binding effect as precedent. See supra note 179.
250 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
251 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947).
252 This lack of legislative guidance likely is due to the expectation that the word
"normally" would be interpreted as it normally is. The circular nature of this statement
only highlights the interpretive problem.
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ment. 253 If Congress created the employment tax exemption to ad-
dress the realities of the fishing industry, the IRS should interpret
the terms of that exemption with those same realities in mind. By
refusing to do so, the IRS effectively scuttles the expressed policy of
Congress and threatens the livelihood of fishing boat owners who
"honestly believed the determination of compliance with the '9/10
men rule' would be done on an annual basis."2 54
2. "Pers " Tradition Versus Treasury
The courts and Congress have recognized that the fishing-
industry tradition of paying pers is centuries old.2 55 In enacting the
section 3121(b)(20) exemption, Congress did not explicitly prohibit
this traditional form of compensation, but simply required that a
fisherman's remuneration depend solely on the amount of the
boat's catch.25 6 In a published revenue ruling, the IRS subsequently
interpreted this latter requirement as prohibiting the payment of
fixed-amount pers.2 5 7
Recognizing the need for change, the New Bedford fishing in-
dustry "sought a way to eliminate the 'flat fee' PER in order to com-
ply with the technical interpretation of the law." 2 581 The industry
ultimately adopted a sliding-scale method, which calculated pers as
a percentage of the gross stock.259 Through the use of this sliding
scale, the industry preserved the traditional twenty-five-dollar per,
253 Namely, "to remove [employment tax] obligations from certain small boat opera-
tors by treating their crewmen as self-employed individuals." GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAx REFORM Acr OF 1976, supra note 141, at 381.
254 Letter from Lourie & Cutler, P.C. to Bob O'Connell, District Director of Internal
Revenue (Dec. 12, 1988) (on file with author). The sincerity of the boatowners' belief is
buttressed by the following consideration:
[T]here is no advantage to the boat owner in going out with a crew of
larger than nine men. The advantage in one sense is to the crew who do
not have to work as hard when there are more men on board. On the
other hand, if there are more men in the crew, then the share of each
person is proportionately reduced. If the owner has no economic advan-
tage... from controlling the size of the crew . . . , then ... it is unfair for
the IRS to take a restrictive interpretation of the word "normally" and
thereby penalize a person who gets no economic advantage from having a
larger crew on his boat.
Id. at 3. Thus, a boat owner has to risk losing his employment tax exemption by inten-
tionally carrying a crew larger than the acceptable limit.
255 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
256 See supra text accompanying note 182. The bills proposed by Senator John F.
Kerry and Representative Brian J.-Donnelly reflect continued legislative recognition of
this tradition. Both bills set an upper limit on the amount of a per, but do not forbid
them altogether. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
257 Rev. Rul. 77-102, 1977-1 C.B. 299. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
258 Letter from Lourie & Cutler, P.C. to Bob O'Connell, District Director of Internal
Revenue 3 (Dec. 12, 1988) (on file with author).
259 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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while satisfying what it understood to be the requirements of section
3121(b)(20). 260 In the absence of IRS objection, this method pre-
vailed until the most recent audit.2 61
The IRS's sudden rejection of the sliding scale method is incon-
sistent with its treatment of another element of the traditional lay
system. The captain of a fishing vessel, while he does not receive a
per like the mate, cook, and engineer, does receive ten percent of
the owner's share in addition to his share as a member of the
crew.262 The amount of this additional payment is often signifi-
candy greater than that of a de minimis per,263 yet the IRS has
raised no objection to this form of compensation. If the IRS objects
to the calculation of pers as a percentage of gross stock, however, it
should surely object to the captain's receipt of a percentage of the
owner's share.26 4
Its apparent inconsistency notwithstanding, the IRS's disap-
proval of the sliding scale seeks to alter the *statutory conditions of
the boat owners' exemption. Whether a per is a percentage of the
gross stock, the net stock, the crew's share, 265 or the owner's share,
it is, in a strictly mathematical sense, a share of the boat's catch.
Technically, that is all the language of section 3121(b)(20) and the
regulations promulgated thereunder require.
260 To demonstrate the application of the sliding scale, if the gross stock for a given
trip is $1000, the schedule provides for a per of 2.5%, or $25. If the gross stock is
$5000, the per is .5%. If the gross stock is $20,000, the per is .125%. If the gross stock
is $40,000, the per is .0625%. When the actual numbers are not round, the pers do not
vary from $25 by much. For example, if the gross stock is $18,000, the schedule pro-
vides for a .138% per, or $24.84.
261 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
262 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
263 When the owner's share is 60% of the net stock (gross stock minus expenses),
then the additional amount paid to the captain is equal to 6% of the net stock. In a
moderately successful trip, a scalloper might bring in 10,000 pounds of scallops. With
the price hovering around $4 per pound, such a trip would yield a gross stock of
$40,000. After expenses (gear, food, repairs, etc.) are deducted, assume a net stock of
$30,000. The boat owner receives $18,000 (60%), while the crew receives the remain-
ing $12,000 (40%). The captain, in addition to his share of the $12,000, receives $1800
from the boat owner's share-quite a bit more than the $25 pers paid out to the mate,
cook, and engineer.
264 After all, compensation paid directly out of the (putative) employer's own funds
is much more in the nature of wages than compensation paid out of the gross stock.
265 The IRS has intimated that it would accept an approach that calculated pers as a
percentage of the crew's share:
[The] suggestion that the PERS [be] paid out of the crew's share would be
closer to the intent of Section 3121 than the current industry practice of a
PERS payment based on a sliding scale.
Letter from Bob O'Connell, District Director of Internal Revenue, to Lourie & Cutler.
P.C. (Jan. 4, 1989) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
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The sliding scale, while referred to as a "sham" by the IRS,266
represents an attempt by the New Bedford fishing industry to pre-
serve a tradition that has endured for centuries. In an economic
sense, the disputed pers are relatively insignificant, 267 and the boat
owners have no vested interest in paying them according to current
practice. 268 Nevertheless, the IRS persists in its efforts to base enor-
mous deficiencies on these de minimis pers. Its recalcitrance in the
face of the aforementioned equities suggests that there is more be-
hind the current audit project than meets the eye.
3. Right Idea, Wrong Taxpayers
The IRS objective of increasing tax compliance within the fish-
ing industry is legitimate. The failure of many fishermen to report
income realized through cash transactions269 has understandably
made the New Bedford waterfront an object of IRS attention. But in
its current attempt to collect taxes from fishing boat owners, as op-
posed to delinquent fishermen, the IRS ignores both long-standing
policy and basic notions of equity.
Individual fishermen have traditionally shared the boat owners'
belief that they are self-employed. Accordingly, many have consist-
ently paid self-employment taxes on their income.270 In the present
dispute, the IRS maintains that many of those same fishermen are
not self-employed and that the owners of the boats on which they
worked must pay employment taxes on the very same income.
Thomas Barker, a tax specialist in the office of Representative Brian
J. Donnelly, commented that the IRS is being "a little bit disingenu-
ous because this income will be taxed twice." 27' An aide to Repre-
sentative Gerry Studds echoed these sentiments, pointing out that
"in many instances, the forms have been filed correctly and [self-
employment] taxes have been paid." 272 Moreover, there is no indi-
cation that the IRS has made plans to refund these taxes to crew
members if boat owners end up paying the assessed amounts.273
266 Letter from Lourie & Cutler, P.C. to Bob O'Connell, District Director of Internal
Revenue (Dec. 12, 1988) (on file with author).
267 "In the cases currently under audit in New Bedford, this additional compensa-
tion accounts for only four percent of the total compensation." 136 CONG. REc. S4273
(daily ed. Apr. 5, 1990) (statement of Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.)).
268 In fact, the suggested IRS approach of paying pers out of the crew's share, supra
note 265, is more favorable to the boat owners than the sliding-scale method.
269 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
270 The self-employment tax provisions are contained in I.R.C. §§ 1401-03 (1988).
271 White, supra note 4, at A1O (quoting Thomas Barker, a tax specialist in the office
of Rep. Brian J. Donnelly).
272 Id. (quoting Jeffrey Pike, an aide to Rep. Gerry E. Studds).
273 Cf Williams, supra note 151, at 366 ("The Service is unwilling to cooperate in
determining the taxes paid by... employees, and... [it] disagrees with a recommenda-
tion that it assist employers in making the determination.").
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From an equitable standpoint, this attempt by the IRS to "have it
both ways" is clearly suspect.
In effect, by imposing employment tax obligations on the boat
owners, the IRS forces274 them to pay taxes that it is itself unable to
collect from individual fishermen. 275 From an administrative stand-
point, it is far easier for the IRS to monitor hundreds of boat owners
than to keep track of thousands of fishermen who often move from
boat to boat, or in and out of the fishing industry itself. 276 As Con-
gress has recognized, however, it is also easier for the boat owners
to be free from paying employment taxes.277
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 addressed the latter reality and
explicitly favored the boat owners by creating an exemption for
them. The IRS's current efforts to reinterpret the conditions of that
exemption in order to generate revenue run counter to the policy
underlying its creation-namely, the protection of the owners of
small fishing operations. If the IRS wants to reverse this policy, it
should do so through the same legislative process by which the ex-
emption was created and not through a reinterpretation of statutory
language.
B. Navigating Troubled Waters: The Need for Notice 278
The substance of its position aside, the IRS is subject to criti-
cism for its attempt to apply newly asserted interpretations retroac-
274 In keeping with the maritime flavor of the subject matter, perhaps it would be
more accurate to say that the boat owners are being "shanghaied."
275 This is the titular "hidden agenda" referred to earlier. See supra note 223-29 and
accompanying text. If the New Bedford boat owners are ultimately held liable for the
assessed back taxes, they will not collect them from the fishermen on their boats (many
of whom have paid their own taxes), but will have to pay the deficiencies out of their own
pockets. This result is not only inequitable, but could lead to the potential bankruptcy
of some boat owners. See supra note 4.
276 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. One can liken the situation to fishing
itself. Smaller fish (the individual fishermen) pass more easily through the mesh of a
fisherman's (the IRS's) net. Larger fish (the boat owners) are less numerous, but are
caught in the net more easily. By law, the fisherman (the IRS) has long had to throw the
big ones back. But now, frustrated by the elusiveness of the smaller fish, the fisherman
(the IRS) is trying to reinterpret the terms of his fishing permit (§ 3121 (b)(20)) to allow
him to keep the larger fish that he can catch. He has devoted considerable effort (finan-
cial resources) to this voyage (audit), and he doesn't want to return to port (Washing-
ton) without filling his hold (coffer). Driven by this motivation, he does not seem to
realize (or care) that by keeping the bigger fish, he jeopardizes the existence of the spe-
cies-not to mention that of the little fish who depend upon the bigger fish to survive.
277 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
278 In other areas of the law 'notice,' to be legally meaningful, must be
sufficiently explicit to inform a reasonably prudent person of the legal
consequences of failure to comply with a law or regulation. In view of the
complexities of federal taxation, fundamental fairness should prompt the
Commissioner to refrain from the retroactive assessment of a tax in the
absence of ... notice or of clear congressional authorization.
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tively.279 The IRS, of course, maintains that its interpretations of
section 3121(b)(20) are not new, but merely explain what the legis-
lation has meant all along.2 8 0 This contention is somewhat dubious.
Over the course of a decade, the IRS has been aware of fishing in-
dustry practice under section 3121(b) (20), yet only now has decided
to enforce the "true" meaning of the statute.28 1 In any event, courts
generally consider retroactive regulations as reviewable regardless
of whether they are legislative or interpretive.2 2
Concluding that the IRS has applied a new position retroac-
tively does not automatically render it invalid. Indeed, the Internal
Revenue Code bestows a presumption of retroactivity on any ruling
or regulation promulgated by the IRS. 28s This presumption is re-
buttable, however, when the taxpayer can show that the Commis-
sioner abused his discretion by not making the ruling or regulation
only prospective in effect.28 4 In the words of the court of claims:
Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 38 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). See also Flamingo Fishing Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 625, 629 (1991) (In
ruling on the IRS's motion for a protective order in its pending litigation with New
Bedford boatowners, Judge Nettesheim recognized that "[t]he IRS is obliged to give
adequate notice to an employer of its duty to withhold.").
279 Apparently, New Bedford fishing boat owners are not the first taxpayers to fall
victim to retroactive reclassifications. In describing the IRS's ruling and technical advice
procedures, one commentator has explained:
Many of the taxpayers receiving retroactive assessments had been relying
on existing precedents that seemed clearly pertinent, or on years of con-
sistent treatment of the affected individuals as independent contractors
with no question having been raised by the IRS. Consequently, they saw
no need to request rulings.
Flynn, supra note 16, at 917.
280 Cf Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1971)
("To the extent that a regulation interprets or elucidates the meaning of a statute, it is
merely explanatory or confirmatory rather than retroactive.").
281 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
282 See Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 984 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978) ("Neither the courts nor Congress have drawn any dis-
tinctions between interpretive and legislative Treasury Regulations as regards their ret-
roactivity."); see also Kaiser Cement Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 34, 39 (1985) ("The
distinction between 'legislative' rulemaking and rulemaking that is merely 'interpretive'
of existing law has been discredited for purposes of analyzing the propriety of according
Treasury Regulations retroactive effect.").
283 "The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regula-
tion, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect."
I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1988).
284 Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957) ("The
Commissioner's action may not be disturbed unless, in the circumstances of [the] case,
the Commissioner abused the discretion vested in him .... "). The relatively heavy
burden on the taxpayer to show such an abuse has prompted criticism from some com-
mentators. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
371, 395 (1967):
In perhaps no other area of federal activity does the regulatory authority
have as immediate an impact on the welfare of such a large segment of
the population as does the Department of Treasury in its administration
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"[T]he Commissioner's exercise of discretion is reviewable... for
abuse, in the same way as other discretionary administrative deter-
minations. The [IRS] does not have carte blanche. Its choice must be
a rational one, supported by relevant considerations. ' 28 5
In Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States,286 the Fifth Circuit de-
scribed three factual situations in which courts would usually find an
abuse of discretion: (1) when retroactivity would work a change in
settled law or policy relied on by the taxpayer and implicitly ap-
proved by Congress; (2) when retroactivity would lead to a result in
a particular case that would be unduly harsh; and (3) when retroac-
tivity would lead to inequality of treatment between similarly situ-
ated taxpayers.28 7 The present dispute between the IRS and the
boat owners seems to fall squarely within the first two of these
situations. 288
1. Reliance on Settled Policy
In Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. United States,289 the IRS at-
tempted to apply retroactively a ruling that purported to clarify the
computation of the taxpayer's bad debt reserve. The Fourth Circuit
rebutted the IRS's reversal of position, stating that the government
was well aware of, and had unequivocally tolerated, the method of
of the Code. Yet it is the agency that has been perhaps the least super-
vised by the federal courts;
Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal Tax Regulators, 48
OHIO ST. LJ. 773, 813 (1987):
When an agency seeks retroactively to substitute a new decisional rule for
an existing one, it should take the laboring oar on review, all the more
because what it seeks to do is generally regarded with disfavor. If it can-
not muster substantial reasons for the allowance of retroactivity, it should
be confined to prospective change;
Paul Gordon Hoffman, Comment, Limits on Retroactive Decision Making by the Internal Reve-
nue Seroice: Redefining Abuse of Discretion Under Section 7805(b), 23 UCLA L. REv. 529, 529
(1976) ("The [IRS] remains free to restate the law retroactively with littlejudicial super-
vision."); cf. ABA Section of Taxation, Planning Committee, Report on Exercise by the Treas-
ury Department and the Internal Revenue Service of the Authority Granted by Internal Revenue Code
Section 7805(b) to Prescribe the Extent to Which Tax Rulings or Regulations Shall Be Applied
Without Retroactive Effect, 42 TAx LAw. 621, 664, 665 (1989) ("Our study indicates that
.... [a]lthough the actions we have reviewed are generally commendable ..... various
actions .... should not have been made retroactive .... These latter situations, the
Planning Committee explained, involved "more or less, a reversal of prior pqsition.").
285 International Business Mach. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 920 (Ct. CLI 1965).
286 562 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1977).
287 Id. at 981. For another potential path to finding an abuse of IRS discretion, see
Bryan T. Camp, Note, The Retroactivity of Treasury Regulations: Paths to Finding Abuse of
Discretion, 7 VA. TAx REv. 509 (1988).
288 To the extent that the IRS does not enforce its new interpretation of
§ 3121(b)(20) nationwide, the third situation might also apply.
289 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973).
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
computation with full knowledge of its prevalence. The court found
the effect on the taxpayer "too inequitable to be permissible." 290
The IRS's prior knowledge of, and lack of objection to, the fish-
ing industry's practices under section 3121(b)(20) should lead to a
similar result.291 There is no inherent economic motivation for the
boat owners to perpetuate the contested arrangements. However,
there is a strong incentive for them to tailor their compensation
schemes to preserve their employment tax exemption. Pursuant to
that incentive, the boat owners have consistently sought to satisfy
the conditions of section 3121(b)(20), while at the same time pre-
serving traditional elements of the fishing industry. If the results of
those efforts do not satisfy the IRS, the Service should provide guid-
ance for future practice and should not penalize boat owners who
believed that they were complying with the law.
2. Harshness of the Result
A court may hold for the taxpayer when retroactivity leads to a
harsh or inequitable result.292 For example, in Lesavoy Foundation v.
Commissioner,293 the IRS retroactively revoked the taxpayer's certifi-
cate of charitable exemption, assessing a tax deficiency that ex-
ceeded the taxpayer's assets. 294 The court recognized the
290 Id. at 409. But see Chevron Oil Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1373, 1381 (Ct. Cl.
1973) ("Prior administrative practice is always subject to change through the exercise of
the continuing rulemaking power of the agency.").
291 Viewing the abuse of discretion inquiry as one of equitable estoppel, the follow-
ing excerpt rings true:
The claim of the government to an immunity from estoppel is in fact a
claim to exemption from the requirements of morals and justice. As
such, it needs to be jealously scrutinized at every step. Confidence in the
fairness of government cements our social institutions. No pinch-penny
enrichment of the government can compensate for an impairment of that
confidence, for the affront to morals and justice involved is the repudia-
tion of a governmental representation.
Raoul Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 680, 707 (1954).
A similar idea is expressed more colloquially by another commentator:
It is difficult to see how a taxpayer can maintain respect for a government
or a judicial process when he is told that the reason the IRS can change
its mind years after the taxpayer relied on its published announcement of
what the law means is that the IRS does not make the law. Instead, he is
told that at the beginning of the book there is a paragraph that says the
rules can be changed at any time and applied retroactively to his situa-
tion, because such a post hoc interpretation is what Congress meant all
along.
Richard M. Ireland, Jr., Comment, Retroactivity and IRC § 7805-A Plea to the IRS to Exer-
cise Its Discretion to Limit Its Discretion, 28 Loy. L. REV. 483, 513 (1982).
292 Though such cases may implicitly assume that the IRS has abused its discretion,
it is more likely that they rest upon due process considerations. Ireland, supra note 291,
at 494.
293 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956).
294 Id. at 590.
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Commissioner's general right to correct a mistake of law, but it
nevertheless held: "[T]he bounds of permissible discretion were
exceeded when the Commissioner changed his mind as to the ex-
emption to be granted to the foundation and made it liable for a tax
bill so large as to wipe it out of existence." 295
In Schuster v. Commissioner,296 the Ninth Circuit adopted a similar
view, reversing a determination of the Commissioner: "It is con-
ceivable that a person might sustain such a profound and uncon-
scionable injury in reliance on [IRS] action as to require, in
accordance with any sense ofjustice and fair play, that the [IRS] not
be allowed to inflict the injury.1 297 Some commentators have de-
scribed this opinion as "truly representative of a realistic approach
to quasi-estoppel. ' '298
In the context of the present dispute, to say that an outcome
favorable to the IRS would be unduly harsh on the New Bedford
fishing boat owners borders on understatement. 299 Like the taxpay-
ers in Lesavoy, the boat owners face a tax deficiency that threatens to
destroy their operations.30 0 Such a result not only would be inequi-
table, but would controvert the express policy of Congress to fore-
stall bankruptcies in the fishing industry.30 1
In all likelihood, taxpayers and the IRS will always disagree on
the application of the Internal Revenue Code to various situations.
Despite their competing interests, however, they should agree on
the importance of sound tax-administration policies. In the interest
of those policies, "[t]he inherent unfairness of retroactivity, even if
not tantamount to an abuse of discretion, should be avoided when-
ever possible."30 2
295 Id. at 594. See also Conway Import Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 5, 14-15
(E.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that the IRS abused its discretion in attempting to retroac-
tively impose record-keeping requirements on a taxpayer whose record-keeping had
been previously approved).
296 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962).
297 Id. at 317. See also Elkins v. Commissioner,'81 T.C. 669, 679-81 (1983) (holding
that the IRS cannot apply an interpretation retroactively when "there is evidence of
unconscionable injury or undue hardship suffered by the taxpayer through reliance on
the erroneous position") (quoting Manocchio v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 989, 1001
(1982)).
298 Theodore S. Lynn & Mervyn S. Gerson, Qyasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as
Applied Against the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAx L. REv. 487, 497 (1964).
299 See supra note 4.
300 Natalie White, Boat Owners Fear for Their Future in Tax Squabble, THE STANDARD-
TMES (New Bedford), Apr. 2, 1990, at 1.
301 See supra note 139.
302 Ireland, supra note 291, at 514.
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CONCLUSION
The treatment fishermen have received under the federal em-
ployment tax provisions has, for the most part, reflected the unique
nature of their profession. The Supreme Court declared that a
maritime standard should be applied to determine their employ-
ment status, and Congress subsequently exempted many of them
from employment tax liability. The current IRS effort to obviate
that exemption by way of retroactive interpretations of the Internal
Revenue Code runs counter to the express policy underlying section
3121(b)(20).
As a matter of administrative convenience, it is obviously much
easier for the IRS to impose liability on individual boat owners than
to pursue the thousands of fishermen who man their boats. But if
the delinquency of individual fishermen deprives the Treasury of
revenues, the IRS should not hold the boat owners responsible
through a retroactive reinterpretation of existing law. 30 3 To do so
would threaten the vitality of the commercial fishing industry and
strike a blow to "all who would place justice above revenue." 3 4
Matthew J. Rita
303 "If effective administration of the Code requires increasing voluntary compliance
by taxpayers, then retroactive application of regulations in an area where a previous
regulation or otherwise settled policy was reasonable seems a poor way to achieve it."
Camp, supra note 287, at 532.
304 Note, The Emerging Concept of Tax Estoppel, 40 VA. L. REV. 313, 330 (1954).
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